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Abstract 
This paper provides new evidence on the impact of microfinance on job creation beyond self-
employment. We examine wage-employment effects for a typical program in Eastern Europe with 
average loan sizes that are considerably above what has been studied so far. We apply propensity 
score matching extended by a difference-in-differences estimator to panel data from an individual-
lending program to firms in Bulgaria. Our results indicate that microcredit has very positive effects on 
job creation. Participating firms have on average 2.5 (or 33 percent) more employees two years after 
receiving a microcredit than matched non-participants. This strong effect seems to be related to a 
certain loan size threshold necessary for positive impacts to unfold. Effects are largest for the smallest 
firms, supporting findings from other studies that small firms are more constrained by credit than large 
firms. Investigating dynamic effects for up to six years after treatment, we furthermore show that ef-
fects are long lasting. 
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Microfinance is deemed to be a strategy for creating jobs. The European Union (EU, 2010), for exam-
ple, has embraced microfinance as a measure to increase employment levels in Europe until 2020. 
The rationale on which the promise to create jobs rests is typically as follows: Poor entrepreneurial 
individuals could earn high marginal returns through business activity but are credit constrained. Ac-
cess to microcredit, defined as small loans to underserved entrepreneurs and their micro-enterprises, 
would then help realize growth opportunities by starting or expanding businesses, thus spurring em-
ployment (see Banerjee and Duflo, 2014; De Mel et al., 2008; Fafchamps and Schündeln, 2013; 
Karlan and Morduch, 2010; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008). 
Given that job creation is a major concern for policymakers worldwide, it is one of the reasons why 
microfinance has become increasingly popular since its emergence in the mid-1970s. Microfinance 
programs that provide microcredit next to other financial services are now widespread in low- and 
middle-income countries and have recently emerged in high-income countries as well. In total, about 
200 million people worldwide are considered to be clients of some 3,600 microfinance institutions 
(Maes and Reed, 2012) and vast amounts of public and private funds are committed to microfinance 
programs; for example, USD 34 billion was committed in 2015 (CGAP, 2016). 
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The empirical evidence on the impact of microcredit on employment remains nevertheless astonish-
ingly scarce. Among the large number of microfinance evaluations, most of the studied programs 
have other objectives than job creation, such as income stabilization, consumption or empowerment 
of women. Moreover, studies that do assess programs aiming at employment creation are usually 
limited to the impact of microcredit on self-employment (e.g. Angelucci et al., 2015; Attanasio et al., 
2015; Augsburg et al., 2015; Chemin, 2008; Coleman, 1999 and 2006; Crépon et al., 2015; 
Duvendack and Palmer-Jones, 2012; Montgomery, 2005; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Roodman and 
Morduch, 2014; Setboonsarng and Parpiev, 2008). While enabling self-employment is an important 
outcome, we believe that the acclaimed substantial contribution to job creation and economic growth 
is only achieved if microcredit succeeds in increasing wage-employment.  
As far as the impact on wage-employment in the literature is concerned, results are still very mixed. 
Interestingly, among the few existing studies those focusing on the smallest loan amounts (around 
USD 200 in market exchange rates or USD 750 in purchasing power parity adjusted exchange rates)1 
find negative effects (Banerjee, Duflo, et al., 2015; Karlan and Zinman, 2011). Those studies on the 
other hand which evaluate the increase in wage-employment for programs with loan sizes about twice 
as large (around USD 500 in market exchange rates and USD 1,500 PPP-adjusted) find moderately 
positive effects (Dunn and Arbuckle, 2001; Tedeschi and Karlan, 2010; Gubert and Roubaud, 2011). 
The evidentiary base is still far too small for being conclusive. Nevertheless, these first results point to 
the fact that a certain loan size threshold might be necessary for wage-employment effects to unfold. 
This is also suggested by Banerjee (2013) who argues that one of the main reasons why most impact 
studies find a limited impact of microcredit could be that loans are too small for productive purposes. 
As even the largest loans in experiments amount to less than USD 1,000 (market exchange rates), 
the effects from larger microloans remain largely unknown. 
Against this background, it seems very worthwhile to investigate wage-employment effects of a micro-
credit program with larger loan sizes than what has been studied so far. This not only provides an 
opportunity for testing if there indeed exits a necessary loan size threshold, but also if larger loans 
lead to larger positive effects. For this purpose, the Eastern European region provides an interesting 
case study with average loan sizes of approximately USD 2,500 compared to a global average of 
USD 700 at market exchange rates (MIX-Market, 2013). This difference only partially reflects the 
more advanced economic development of Eastern Europe compared to other regions. Larger loan 
sizes can be additionally explained by the widespread provision of microfinance in Eastern Europe by 
financially self-sustaining banks which tend to lend in greater volumes than not-for profit institutions 
(Cull et al., 2009; Hartarska et al., 2006). The provision of larger loans is furthermore enabled by the 
fact that microfinance institutions in the region typically lend to individual borrowers with already exist-
ing micro-businesses rather than applying the traditional group-lending approach for poor individuals 
or households who do not necessarily have previous entrepreneurial experience and a track record of 
successful lending and repayment (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000).  
It is all the more surprising that the assessment of microfinance programs in Eastern Europe has been 
largely neglected so far. With regard to employment, the only existing study by Augsburg et al. (2015) 
investigates self-employment effects in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The lack of evidence for Eastern 
Europe is moreover in sharp contrast to the fact that in regional terms, the former Soviet Republics of 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia continue to receive the largest share of worldwide commitments to 
microfinance (CGAP, 2016). 
                                                   
1 To compare loan sizes across countries we use purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted exchange rates which 
are calculated by applying a conversion factor to market exchange rates. The PPP adjusted rates indicate how 
many USDs are needed to buy a USD’s worth of goods in a domestic market as compared to the United States. 
If not stated otherwise we use rates for 2006 according to http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPPC.RF 
(Accessed: 13 March 2017). Any conversions from EUR to USD are based on exchange rates for 31 December 
2006 as indicated on https://www.oanda.com/lang/de/currency/converter/ (Accessed: 13 March 2017). 
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This paper therefore helps close two research gaps simultaneously. It first adds to the scarce litera-
ture on impact assessments of microfinance beyond self-employment by assessing wage-
employment effects from microloans which are larger in size than what has been studied so far. By 
drawing on empirical evidence from a program in Bulgaria with typical features for the region, the 
study also contributes to the very limited evidence on microfinance in Eastern Europe. In fact, this 
study is to the best of our knowledge the first assessment of wage-employment effects from micro-
credit in an economically more developed context with relatively large loan sizes. 
The unique combination of program data with a country-wide firm-level database enables us to apply 
propensity score matching methods extended by a difference-in-differences estimator. Our main sam-
ple consists of a balanced panel dataset from 2003-2010 of 974 participating firms that received a 
program loan in 2004 and 60,032 non-participating firms used for matching. The context of the pro-
gram was chosen in a manner that ensures a largely limited supply of credit to micro and small firms 
other than from the assessed microfinance program. We test the robustness of our results regarding 
variations within the matching process. We also assess the sensitivity of results to a potentially re-
maining selection on unobservables into the program. Our results prove to be robust, and we find 
strong positive and significant effects of microcredit with respect to the number of employees in partic-
ipating firms. In fact, participants have on average 2.5 (or 33 percent) more employees two years after 
receiving a microcredit than matched non-participants. This positive effect also holds if we include 
further variables in our propensity score estimations and longer time trends before treatment for sub-
samples. Heterogeneous effects for different firm size classes are largest for the smallest firms, which 
supports findings from other studies that small firms are more constrained by credit than large firms. 
With respect to loan size, we test whether larger loans lead to larger effects. As we find a very similar 
impact of 25-30 percent on wage-employment irrespective of the loan amount, this rather points to a 
certain loan size threshold for positive effects to unfold and that the loans assessed in this study are 
above that threshold. Observing dynamic effects for up to six years after receiving a microcredit, we 
furthermore show that effects are long-lasting. Our results also suggest considering an evaluation 
period of minimum two or more years after treatment for at least two reasons: First, an immediate 
expansion of employees directly after treatment is followed by a subsequent contraction in firm size 
before a sustainable new level of firm size is attained two years after treatment. Second, effects for 
different loan purposes, i.e., working capital or fixed assets, also occur at different points in time and 
seem to warrant longer evaluation periods. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review on the im-
pact of microfinance on job creation, an overview of access to finance for small firms in Bulgaria and a 
brief description of the program. Section 3 describes the data used in this study and presents descrip-
tive results. Section 4 illustrates the identification strategy. The main results of our estimations are 
then discussed in Section 5, which also contains an analysis of dynamic and heterogeneous effects. 
Finally, we present sensitivity tests of our results in Section 6 before concluding in Section 7. 
2 MICROFINANCE, SMALL FIRMS AND JOB CREATION 
2.1 PREVIOUS IMPACT ASSESSMENTS ON MICROFINANCE AND EMPLOYMENT 
Impact assessments of microfinance are numerous by now (for an overview see for example the me-
ta-analyses by Duvendack et al., 2011; Pande et al., 2012 or van Rooyen et al., 2012). With regard to 
results, Banerjee, Karlan, et al. (2015) conclude in the introductory chapter to six randomized evalua-
tions that there is “a consistent pattern of modestly positive, but not transformative effects of micro-
finance.” This finding now seems to have emerged after very high initial expectations on the part of 
proponents of microcredit (including for example the award of the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2006 to 
Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank as pioneers of microfinance or the declaration of 2005 as 
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the Year of Microcredit by the United Nations) were followed by widespread skepticism on the part of 
researchers about its positive impact (see, for example, Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010). 
As far as effects on employment are concerned, the evidence is still more limited for two reasons. 
First, the vast majority of evaluated programs are not designed to create employment. Rather, they 
aim at increasing income and consumption, poverty reduction or various other outcomes such as 
school attendance of children or empowerment of women. This is particularly the case for so-called 
group lending approaches from economically less developed regions which dominate the body of 
evidence and require borrowers, often women with no previous business experience, to form small 
groups for joint lending and repaying. Second, those studies which do assess programs aiming at 
employment creation are usually limited to the impact on self-employment. Only a handful of evalua-
tions investigate the impact of microfinance on wage-employment. Table 1 summarizes the existing 
literature on employment effects of microfinance by distinguishing between effects on self- and wage-
employment. Self-employment in this context includes the creation of a micro-enterprise. Moving from 
non-employer to employer by growing an enterprise in terms of employees on the other hand is re-
garded as wage-employment effect.  
(Table 1 about here) 
While some studies find positive effects on self-employment (Abou-Ali et al., 2010; Banerjee, Duflo, et 
al., 2015; Dunn and Arbuckle, 2001; Tedeschi and Karlan, 2010), others show negative ones (Gubert 
and Roubaud, 2011; Karlan and Zinman, 2011), or mixed results depending on the gender of borrow-
ers (Chemin, 2008; Montgomery, 2005; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Roodman and Morduch, 2014), 
individual versus group lending (Attanasio et al., 2015) and informal versus formal sector (Bruhn and 
Love, 2014) and yet a last group of studies does not detect any significant impact at all (Angelucci et 
al., 2015; Coleman, 1999 and 2006; Crépon et al., 2015; Duvendack and Palmer-Jones, 2012; Set-
boonsarng and Parpiev, 2008). The heterogeneity of estimated effects for self-employment is also 
reflected in a synthesis study on the impact of improved access to finance (including microfinance) on 
employment by Grimm and Paffhausen (2015). They conclude that only 20 out of 54 impact estimates 
from studies under consideration showed a positive effect on employment, in 2 cases a negative ef-
fect was found and 32 estimates were statistically not significant. Overall, the studied programs were 
more effective in creating self-employment than wage-employment. While enabling self-employment 
is an important outcome, we believe that the acclaimed substantial contribution to job creation is only 
achieved if microcredit succeeds in increasing wage employment.  
(Table 2 about here) 
Similar to self-employment, the impact on wage-employment is mixed and rather inconclusive. Table 
2 provides more details on the few existing studies assessing wage-employment effects including 
average loan sizes.2 The evidentiary base is still too small for being conclusive, but it is very interest-
ing to see that those studies which focus on the smallest loan amounts (around USD 200 in market 
exchange rates and USD 750 PPP-adjusted exchange rates) find negative effects (Banerjee, Duflo, et 
al., 2015; Karlan and Zinman, 2011). Those studies on the other hand which evaluate the increase in 
wage-employment for programs with loan sizes about twice as large (around USD 500 in market ex-
change rates and USD 1,500 PPP-adjusted) find moderately positive effects (Dunn and Arbuckle, 
2001; Tedeschi and Karlan, 2010; Gubert and Roubaud, 2011).  
More in detail, the average loan size for borrowers businesses in the Indian program evaluated by 
Banerjee, Duflo, et al. (2015) was USD 200 (or USD 777 PPP-adjusted). The study found a negative, 
but insignificant impact on wage-employment for borrowers with existing businesses before treatment 
                                                   
2  While Abou-Ali et al. (2010) and Bruhn and Love (2014) also assessed wage-employment effects, their 
outcome measure is limited to aggregate employment rates for the population in program areas and municipal-
ities. Information on wage-employment effects in borrowers businesses is not available. 
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(0.05 fewer employees than for controls or about -20% compared to an initial firm size of 0.3 employ-
ees). For borrowers with new businesses the impact was significantly negative (0.2 fewer employees 
than for controls or again about -20% assuming an initial firm size of 0 employees for newly created 
businesses). Because new businesses in treatment areas also had lower profits than in control areas, 
the authors argued that microcredit might have a negative selection effect. It might draw individuals 
into entrepreneurship who actually have less propensity to become successful entrepreneurs than 
existing entrepreneurs. Karlan and Zinman (2011) investigate effects for a program in the Philippines 
with a very similar average loan size of USD 220 (or USD 726 PPP-adjusted). Again, they found neg-
ative effects. The number of paid employees in businesses of the treatment group decreased by 0.27 
(-39%) relative to controls.  
In contrast, Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) who evaluated loans twice as large (USD 586 or USD 1,368 
PPP-adjusted) for a program in Peru found moderatly positive effects of microcredit on wage-
emplyoment. The total number of days worked per month for non-houshold members in the 
borrowers’ top three micro-businesses increased by 2.49 days per month or 0.13 full-time employees 
(4%) assuming 20 days of work per month. Tedeschi and Karlan (2010) re-estimated the impact for 
the same dataset by additionally accounting for program attrition between the baseline and follow-up 
survey. Their results show that the increase in wage-employment was over-estimated by Dunn and 
Arbuckle (2001), but is still positive with an increase of 1.18 days per month, 0.06 employees or 3%. 
Finally, Gubert and Roubaud (2011) study the largest loan sizes so far in terms of PPP with an aver-
age amount of USD 443 (1,616 PPP-adjusted). The effects on wage-employment in borrowers busi-
nesses were clearly positive (+9% employees), but insignificant. Results for other measures of firm 
growth such as sales and profits were however significantly positive. 
2.2 CREDIT CONSTRAINTS FOR SMALL FIRMS IN BULGARIA 
The impact of microcredit on wage-employment is supported by economic theory arguing that entre-
preneurial individuals are credit constrained; otherwise, they would engage in profitable business 
activities. Access to microcredit is supposed to help overcome these credit constraints, making it pos-
sible for individuals to realize growth opportunities by starting or expanding businesses, which creates 
employment. To assess impacts, it is therefore necessary to identify an adequate group of credit-
constrained firms that do not participate in the program and compare them to participants. The pur-
pose of this section is to discuss whether such a control group can be found in our research context.  
One might argue that, ideally, neither participants nor non-participants should have previous access 
to finance before the start of the program and that, moreover, non-participants should remain without 
access during the evaluation period. In reality, it is very unlikely to find firms that are totally excluded 
from the financial sector, and to some extent, it is not even a necessary condition. Most businesses 
have at least access to informal sources of finance such as moneylenders or family and friends. Re-
search shows, however, that informal ﬁnancial institutions co-exist with microfinance and play a com-
plementary role in the formal ﬁnancial sector, offering small, unsecured, short-term loans (Ayyagari et 
al., 2010; Guirkinger, 2008; Madestam, 2014). Microfinance’s promise to create wage-employment by 
enabling investments in profitable business opportunities therefore seems independent of the exist-
ence of an informal financial sector. As far as access to loans from the formal financial sector is con-
cerned, we nonetheless need to take great care in discussing its availability to the control group. 
The data for our empirical analysis contain information on take-up3 of formal loans from the program 
lender ProCredit Bank Bulgaria before and during the evaluation. Accordingly, we are able to exclude 
any firms from the control group of non-participants that received loans from ProCredit Bank. Since 
ProCredit Bank was the largest provider of microfinance in Bulgaria, we already control for the most 
                                                   
3 Information on access would be the better variable, but is not available. In section 5.4.4, we however test the 
matching of participants with non-participants from districts without program presence. 
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important source of formal finance for small firms. Furthermore, we chose a context in terms of coun-
try and time period where access to formal finance was still very limited in general. However, since 
the data do not, unfortunately, provide information on access to loans from other banks or micro-
finance institutions, we next provide an overview on the general availability of bank credit during the 
period under review.  
It is worth noting that the availability of alternative credit to non-participants is of course an issue that 
also other impact assessments of microcredit face. In the case of Banerjee, Duflo, et al. (2015), for 
example, almost no microcredit was available at baseline (although about two-thirds of sample 
households had at least one loan outstanding from informal financial sources), but during treatment 
other microcredit programs simultaneously started operations. The authors suggested that one can 
still interpret differences between treated and controls as being a result of the microcredit program as 
long as borrowing rates are at least higher among treated than controls. We have good cause to 
assume that this is the case for our group of participants compared to non-participants. Furthermore, 
Wydick (2016) demonstrates that experimental studies focusing on marginal borrowers are likely to 
understate the impacts yet realised by inframarginal borrowers – those having taken microfinance 
loans prior to implementation of an experiment. Provided that loans have a positive impact on 
employment, we can furthermore argue that if a certain share of control firms benefits from alternative 
loans, we would rather underestimate the positive effect of the program loans on participant 
employment levels. 
2.2.1 THE DEMAND FOR CREDIT 
To answer how credit-constrained our non-participants were, we first address the demand side of 
finance. The target group of the program under review is micro-enterprises with less than 10 employ-
ees. More precisely, a vast majority of the 78 percent of microcredit clients in our sample were micro-
enterprises at the start of the program. Further, 20 percent were small enterprises (with less than 50 
employees), and 2 percent were medium-sized enterprises (with up to 250 employees) defined ac-
cording to EU (2005). As many statistical sources treat micro-, small- and medium-enterprises 
(MSMEs) as one group of firms in contrast to large enterprises, we use the term ‘small firms’ when 
referring to the group of firms with up to 250 employees. 
By 2003 – the starting point of the period under review - existed around 240,000 micro-, small- and 
medium-sized enterprises in Bulgaria.4  Small firms were considered the engine of the Bulgarian 
economy: They constituted 99.7 percent of all enterprises (90 percent were micro-enterprises), gen-
erated 79 percent of employment, accounted for 75 percent of turnover and 61 percent of the added 
value of private enterprises (Ministry of Economy, 2004). Bulgaria is not an exceptional case in that 
regard. de Kok et al. (2011) showed that small firms also accounted for 99.8 percent of non-financial 
enterprises in the European Union, with the overwhelming majority of 92 percent being micro-
enterprises. Micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises employed two-thirds of the formal EU 
workforce and 85 percent of total net employment growth was created by small firms from 2002-2010. 
The general economic context for small firms in Bulgaria had improved by 2003 after more than a 
decade of transition to a market economy. Bulgaria had a population of 7.8 million, GDP grew at 5.4 
percent, unemployment amounted to 13.7 percent and it was classified as a lower middle income 
country. In 2007, Bulgaria became a member of the European Union. Nevertheless, its GDP per capi-
ta remains among the lowest in Europe.5  
Despite the vital importance of small firms for the Bulgarian economy, they had difficulties accessing 
formal finance. A survey by the Bulgarian SME Promotion Agency in 2002 showed, for example, that 
                                                   
4 https://infostat.nsi.bg/infostat/pages/reports/result.jsf?x_2=1376 (Accessed: 24 February 2017). 
5 Economic indicators are based on data from Worldbank, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/bulgaria 
(Accessed: 16 November 2015). GDP per capita was USD 2,697 in 2003 and USD 7,499 in 2013. 
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67 percent of small- and medium-sized firms had no access to bank financing (Simeonova-Ganeva et 
al., 2011). The Worldbank (2006) confirmed that in 2002 only 16 percent of interviewed Bulgarian 
firms used formal borrowing from the financial sector for new investments (21 percent in 2005). Not 
surprisingly, access to finance was reported as a major constraint to firm growth. A survey of manag-
ers from small- and medium-sized enterprises in 2003 pointed in the same direction: The shortage of 
financial resources for investment and working capital was considered a major barrier to growth 
(BSMEPA, 2004). In a study by Pissarides et al. (2003) on principal constraints of small and medium 
enterprises in Bulgaria and Russia, top managers also identified the lack of external financing as a 
particularly serious constraint. In addition, Budina et al. (2000) showed that investment decisions of 
medium and large Bulgarian firms in the period 1993-1995 were constrained by liquidity and the 
smaller the firm, the larger were their constraints.  
Evidence from other countries adds further support to the fact that firms are often credit constrained 
and smaller firms are more constrained than larger firms. Ayyagari et al. (2008) showed that of ten 
obstacles in the business environment reported by firms, lack of finance had the largest direct effect 
on firm growth. As for firm size, the authors found smaller firms to be more constrained by financing 
than larger firms. Beck et al. (2005) also found that the significance of growth constraints varies con-
siderably with firm size. It was consistently the smallest firms that are most constrained. For small 
firms, the financing obstacle had almost twice the negative effect on annual growth than it does for 
large firms. In a related study, Beck et al. (2006) focused specifically on the determinants of financing 
obstacles and found that younger, smaller and domestic firms report higher obstacles.  
As for Eastern Europe specifically, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008) compared in Bosnia and Herze-
govina the investment sensitivity to internal funds of micro-firms in municipalities with a signiﬁcant 
presence of microfinance institutions to those in municipalities without any (or limited) presence. Their 
results indicated that microfinance alleviated the ﬁnancing constraints of micro-enterprises. In a 
similar vein, the findings of J. D. Brown et al. (2005) also suggest that the availability of loans is an 
important factor for the growth of start-up firms in Romania. 
2.2.2 THE SUPPLY OF CREDIT 
With regard to the supply of formal financing in 2003, the Bulgarian banking system had recovered 
from several crises since the transition to a market economy. The banking sector consisted of 29 
banks and 6 branches of foreign banks. Foreign ownership dominated and all but 2 banks were 
private. While the banking sector was still relatively small with a ratio of domestic credit to the private 
sector (as percentage of GDP) of 26 percent in 2003 compared to Western countries such as 
Germany with 110 percent or the U.S. with 177 percent,6 bank credit experienced rapid real growth of 
40 percent as in most other countries in Eastern Europe. The risk-averse behavior of banks during the 
early transition period, gradually gave way to increased lending aided by economic recovery and 
privatization of state banks (Duenwald et al., 2007). 
Notwithstanding the overall expansion of bank credit, financing for small firms remained limited as the 
following evidence suggests: Duval and Goodwin-Groen (2005) estimate that in 2001 banks had col-
lectively extended only around 16,000 business loans under EUR 100,000 to the total of Bulgarian 
enterprises (about 240,000). Anecdotal evidence from the program points into the same direction. As 
described in ProCredit Bank Bulgaria’s annual report 2004 ‘when the bank was founded in October 
2001, traditional banks in Bulgaria were still extending loans to small and medium-sized enterprises 
only in exceptional cases. The conventional commercial banks often focus their lending operations on 
corporate finance and consumer lending, but tend to neglect small businesses as a potential clientele. 
Their main reasons for not lending to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises are the perceived 
                                                   
6 http://data.worldbank.org/country/bulgaria (Accessed: 16 November 2015). 
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inadequacy of MSMEs’ accounting methods, their inability to provide sufficient collateral and the high 
administrative costs incurred in small business lending.’ In terms of market share of Bulgarian banks 
in the segment of small business lending, a survey by BSMEPA (2004) covering 8 out of 29 banks 
reveals: out of a total of 13,771 loans extended to small- and medium-sized firms by the surveyed 
banks in 2003, ProCredit Bank Bulgaria is the largest provider in terms of number of loans (5,560 
loans) followed by United Bulgarian Bank (4,537 loans).  
Next to banks, the microfinance sector constitutes another source of formal finance for small firms. 
According to data from MIX-Market7 the gross loan portfolio of microfinance institutions in Bulgaria in 
2004 was worth about USD 200 million and there existed about 37,000 active microfinance borrow-
ers. The microfinance sector was largely dominated by ProCredit Bank Bulgaria, making up for more 
than 90 percent of the loan portfolio and 77 percent of active borrowers.  
The evidence therefore points to the fact that small firms were largely constrained by access to formal 
finance and that it is possible to identify an adequate control group in this research context. Only 
about one third of micro, small and medium-sized firms in Bulgaria indicated any access to formal 
finance in 2002 before start of the program (Simeonova-Ganeva et al., 2011). Access to loans for 
micro- and small firms is assumed to be even much lower (e.g. Budina et al., 2000; Ayyagari et al., 
2008; Beck et al., 2005). In addition, ProCredit Bank Bulgaria was by far the largest provider of 
microcredit in the microfinance sector and one of the largest providers within the banking sector. The 
rapid expansion of the bank’s lending operations to small firms and its large market share can be 
regarded as a further indicator for the limited access to finance of small firms in Bulgaria during the 
period of evaluation. Moreover, small firms indicating access to bank loans were to a considerable 
extent clients of ProCredit Bank and can be consequently excluded from the control group. Finally, if 
some control firms received loans from other providers than ProCredit Bank and if loan effects are 
positive, we should expect to slightly under-estimate the impact of the program. 
2.3 THE PROGRAM - PRO CREDIT BANK BULGARIA 
The program assessed in this paper consists of micro-loans by ProCredit Bank Bulgaria8 and incorpo-
rates many of the characteristics that are typical for microfinance in Eastern Europe. The bank is a 
for-profit microfinance bank9 and part of ProCredit Group, which consists of banks in Eastern Europe, 
Latin America and Germany. It was established in 2001. As expressed by the chairman of its supervi-
sory board in the bank’s first annual report, its establishment was motivated by the under-supply of 
credit to small businesses. The bank’s mission statement further specifies the focus on micro, small- 
and medium-sized enterprises based on the conviction that these businesses create the largest num-
ber of jobs and make a vital contribution to the economy. Job creation is therefore a specific objective 
of the program. The bank’s owners do not expect short-term profit maximization, but nevertheless a 
sustainable return on investment. The bank follows an approach of individual lending to entrepreneurs 
with a minimum experience of 6 months. Its lending operations expanded rapidly. The bank started in 
2001 with 955 loans worth about EUR 5 million. In 2004, the beginning of the period under review, it 
already had a total of 19,390 business loans outstanding worth EUR 127 million. By 2010, the end of 
the review period, the bank had 31,675 business (and agricultural) loans outstanding worth EUR 533 
million. Accordingly, the average loan size for business loans is relatively large even for Eastern Eu-
rope (5,236 in 2001, 6,550 in 2004 and 16,827 in 2010). As for geographical outreach, ProCredit 
Bank Bulgaria started operations with 7 branches. The network grew to 35 branches by the end of 
2004, covering 19 out of 28 Bulgarian districts. In 2010, the country-wide network numbered 75 
branches and outlets.  
                                                   
7 http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/Bulgaria (Accessed: 16 November 2015). 
8 For more information see http://www.procreditbank.bg/en (Accessed: 16 November 2015). 
9 In 2012, ProCredit Group introduced a strategic shift away from its original mission as microfinance bank to 
becoming a financial service provider for small and medium-sized businesses. 
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3 DATA 
3.1 FIRM-LEVEL DATASET 
We constructed a unique dataset by matching two different sources: (i) program data from the micro-
finance bank, and (ii) a firm-level database for Bulgaria. The program data provides us with infor-
mation on loans (amount, date of disbursement, loan purpose, and maturity) and clients. Client data 
on financials and the number of employees is only available for about 75 percent of clients. It is fur-
thermore usually recorded only once at loan approval so that a development over time cannot be 
tracked. We therefore use the program data to identify our sample of program participants and to 
obtain loan information. As for all other information on clients’ characteristics, in particular their num-
ber of employees, we rely on the second source described below. Using one single source of infor-
mation for characteristics of both participants and non-participants also has the advantage of reducing 
an important bias in impact studies as Heckman et al. (1997) point out. 
We define treatment as disbursement10 of a loan from ProCredit Bank between 1 January and 31 
December 2004. The decision to focus on 2004 results from a trade-off between our research design 
and data availability. In a context of continuously expanding credit markets from early 2000s onwards, 
we on the one hand preferred an early period of bank operations where the availability of loans to 
non-participants was still very limited. Our intention was to be better able to attribute the impact to 
microcredit instead of under- or overestimating it as discussed above. On the other hand, we were not 
able to choose yet earlier years of operation (the bank started in October 2001), because data availa-
bility in the firm-level dataset sharply reduces when going more backwards in time. To further define 
treatment, we chose to focus on new clients only, i. e. firms that have not benefitted from earlier loans 
by ProCredit Bank as we consider the first loan to best kick-start a process of growth. Control firms in 
contrast did not receive a microcredit by ProCredit Bank in any year prior to or during our period under 
review. 
With regard to the evaluation period, the firm level database provides us with year-end data (31 De-
cember) from 2000 until 2010. Our baseline hence dates from 31 December 2003 just before start of 
the treatment on 1 January 2004. We then allow the treatment effect to take several years to material-
ize. As the average duration of program loans was 24 months, we accordingly define the end of 2006 
as our main evaluation period, i.e. 24 months after disbursement of the last program loan on 31 De-
cember 2004. In addition, we will also show the dynamic development of treatment effects for other 
periods.  
To further construct our sample, we cleaned the dataset by loan purposes and kept only business 
loans. We deleted loans for consumption and housing, because we assume that non-productive loans 
for private purposes will not have an impact on labor demand in client firms. The core business loan 
products under the program in 2004 were the micro-loans ‘Sprint’ and ‘Dynamo’. The Sprint loan was 
especially popular, because no collateral was required and applications took only 24 hours to pro-
cess. Overall, the average size of a business loan in our sample was EUR 7,092 (equivalent to USD 
9,363 at market exchange rates or USD 23,605 PPP-adjusted). This is considerably above the loan 
sizes of up to about USD 1,616 PPP-adjusted which have been studied so far by other assessment of 
wage-employment effects. 
The bank disbursed loans to 1,153 new formal business clients in 2004. These firms constitute the 
focus of our research because information in the Bulgarian firm-level dataset is confined to formally 
registered businesses. The bank furthermore disbursed a considerable amount of 8,117 business 
loans in the same year to private individuals. These clients are either professionals such as farmers or 
doctors who are not required to register their business or they are owners of informal and formal firms 
                                                   
10 One could argue that firms already start hiring employees at loan approval. As on average only 9 days elapsed 
from loan application to disbursement, it does not seem to make a large difference which stage we use. 
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who received loans for business purposes as private individuals.11 Since the bank provided us with 
information on the formal businesses which are related to private individual clients and vice versa, we 
were able to exclude any participants and non-participants from our dataset who had already received 
a microloan as a private individual in previous years (or during the evaluation period in the case of 
non-participants). Firms which received loans as private individuals differ from those which are legal 
entities in terms of firm size, but both groups belong to the micro firm-size category (<10 employ-
ees).12 Based on employee figures from the bank, formal businesses among clients in 2004 had on 
average 8.1 employees (7.5 including the owner according to Amadeus) while private individuals had 
2.5 employees. Our sample consequently provides evidence on employment effects of microcredit for 
businesses with larger initial firm sizes compared to existing research. 
The second data source is the firm-level database Amadeus (provided by the Bureau van Dijk). It 
contains financial and other information on companies in Europe. Information on the number of em-
ployees per firm in Bulgaria originates from the national social security institute. This means that only 
formal jobs for which firms pay social security are accounted for. The Amadeus database has the 
decisive advantage for the purpose of our research on microcredit to contain a very large number of 
micro-enterprises with less than 10 employees. The dataset at hand contains year-end firm-level in-
formation on registered Bulgarian enterprises from 2000-2010. The coverage of firms in terms of 
number and characteristics increases for more recent years. In 2004, the year of treatment, the data-
base contains 106,894 firms. Out of these observations, information on our outcome of interest (dif-
ference in employees 2003 to 2006) and the necessary covariates for our empirical strategy of match-
ing (location, sector and ownership type) is available for 65,496 firms.13 Data on sales or profits is 
available to a much lesser extent, in particular for micro-sized firms and we decided to not consider its 
availability as requirement for forming our sample. In a next step, we deliberately eliminated any firms 
receiving a business loan from ProCredit Bank from 2001-2003 for participants and 2001-2003 as well 
as 2005-2006 for non-participants either as formally registered business or as private entity (3,833 
firms). This leaves us with 61,663 firms which were merged with program data using the national firm 
identification number. We could identify a large majority (87 percent) of the new clients in 2004 in the 
Amadeus database. In a final step, we excluded large firms (591 firms) because they are too few to 
carry out precise estimations and were not the target group of microloans in the first place and con-
trolled for outliers in terms of employees (66 firms).14 Eventually, we obtain a considerably long, bal-
anced panel dataset of 974 participating firms and 60,032 non-participating firms with annual infor-
mation before, during and after treatment on number of employees, sector, location, ownership type 
and gender of owner.  
Our sample represents 26% of formally registered Bulgarian firms in 2003. As shown below in Table 4 
with regard to firm size before treatment, the set of participating firms is almost identical to the aver-
age Bulgarian firm with 7.2 employees. It is also representative of average firms in terms of sectoral 
and regional distribution.15 The set of non-participating firms on the other hand is of larger size than 
                                                   
11 The informal sector in Bulgaria amounted to about one third of GDP in 2007 according to Williams (2014). The 
disbursement of loans for formal businesses to private individuals was a common practice in the early years of 
bank operations when it took authorities very long to issue the necessary documents for loan applications. 
12 In terms of sectoral activity, 51% of private individuals are classified as "activities of private households as 
employers". The remaining firms are characterized by a higher share in agriculture (8% compared to 3% for le-
gal entities) and a lower share in manufacturing (7% versus 17%), while other sectoral distributions are similar. 
13 The most substantial reduction in sample size (31,667) is caused by missing information on the number of 
employees in 2003. About half of these firms (13,797) are included in the database although they are non-
active. Further 8,492 firms exited in 2003 and did not have any more employees at the end of 2003. The re-
mainder of 9,378 firms did not report information for 2003, but for previous and subsequent years. 
14 We excluded 1 large firm from treated and 590 from controls. We deleted firms with a relative change of 
5,000% or more in employees from 2003-2006 (35 firms from controls and none from treated) as well as firms 
with an absolute change of 300 or more employees (31 firms from controls and none from treated). 
15 https://infostat.nsi.bg/infostat/pages/reports/query.jsf?x_2=1376 (Accessed: 24 February 2017). 
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average firms because only medium-sized and large enterprises were obliged to file official accounts. 
As far as differences between participants and non-participants in our sample are concerned, they 
would however only matter to the extent as they are not controlled for by matching. In that regard, one 
could argue that we for example do not control for management practices although badly managed 
firms are probably less likely to report information to authorities (and thus enter the database) than 
well managed ones. Again, this would only bias our results if among matched non-participants poorly 
managed ones were less likely to provide the full information to official sources than among partici-
pants or vice versa. We do not find reason to believe that this would be the case. 
The dataset has three important advantages: First, sample size for both participants and non-
participants is very large. The number of non-participating firms relative to the number of participating 
firms amounts to 62:1. As we will apply propensity score matching, this increases the likelihood of 
finding one or more non-participating firms that are very similar, if not identical, to each of the partici-
pating firms. Moreover, compared to other evaluations of microfinance, we also have a large number 
of participating firms. Among other things, this enables us to analyze sub-groups of participants in 
terms of firm size, loan features and geographic location for heterogeneous program effects. Second, 
the panel structure of the dataset allows us to use a difference-in-differences approach which controls 
for time-constant unobservables that may have determined the participation in the program and the 
respective performance of firms. In section 4.1 we will further elaborate on this advantage. A third 
significant feature of the dataset is that it allows us to account for firm exits of both participants and 
non-participants. The database contains historical records of inactive companies and we interpret as 
exit if data on employees or any financials is missing from a specific year onwards until the final year 
of the database. We set employee values to zero from the year of exit onwards so as to make firm 
exits result in a negative change of employees. This way, we can avoid the common survivor bias in 
panel data related to attrition of sample firms. Certainly, some of the exits could rather result from the 
acquisition of a company by another one. We cannot distinguish between job destruction due to firms 
that dismiss employee or due to a transfer of employees to other legal entities. In a similar manner, 
job creation captures total firm growth, regardless of whether the increase in employment is the result 
of organic growth (internal) or acquired (external) growth. Overall however, exit rates in the Amadeus 
database correspond very much to what is reported by Eurostat (2009). 
Table 3 shows firm exit rates for participants and non-participants separately. They are much higher 
among non-participants during the evaluation period 2004-2006. The cumulative exit rate for partici-
pants amounts to 2.9 percent, while the corresponding rate for non-participating firms is 13.7 percent. 
Interestingly, for later years from 2007 onwards, the exit rates increase in particular for participants 
and become very similar to non-participants. One explanation could be decreasing effects of micro-
credit over time on firm survival. Since average exit rates increase for all firms in our sample, this 
might also be triggered by the accession of Bulgaria to the European Union in 2007 and increased 
competitive pressure in particular on small domestic firms. Moreover, the effects of the global financial 
crisis on small firms also start to increasingly show from 2007/2008 onwards.16 
(Table 3 about here) 
The main limitation of the dataset is that it does not provide us with more information on outcome 
variables such as sales and profit or data on part-time employment and wages. The literature on small 
firm growth points to the fact that for very small firms, it usually takes a long time to increase one more 
formal employee or as Coad and Hölzl (2012) put it ‘indivisibilities are substantial for very small firms.’ 
They argue that growth effects of microcredit in terms of formal employees will thus not quickly show. 
                                                   
16 Another explanation for the difference in exit rates could be that the program is successful in selecting firms 
that are not going bankrupt in the short-term. It would however presuppose that the bank is able to predict exit 
rates very accurately with regard to loan maturities and that the it furthermore disregards the likelihood of exit 
from 2007 onwards – even though the bank is probably interested in a several follow-up loans. 
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Here it would be good to have information on part-time employment or sales which usually mirrors 
growth faster. In addition, it would be interesting to see how profitability or wage levels are influenced 
by microcredit. Another constraint is that we need to work with limited data for most of the firms in our 
sample as concerns pre-treatment trends, because information on employees and financials for earli-
er years than 2003 is only available for a reduced number of observations. Longer time trends togeth-
er with additional firm characteristics to match upon such as firm age would add further strength to 
robustness of results. Finally, we cannot totally exclude crowding-out effects of participants which 
prosper at the cost of non-participants. The comparison of growth rates for matched and unmatched 
non-participants nevertheless shows that both develop in the same manner. As we have reason to 
believe that potential crowding-out effects would be strongest towards the very similar matched non-
participating firms, our data does not support the existence of such an effect. 
3.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics measured at entry into the microcredit program at the end of 
2003 separately for participants and for non-participants. 
(Table 4 about here) 
Looking at participants first, 78 percent were micro-enterprises with a size of less than 10 employ-
ees.17 20 percent were small firms with 10-49 employees and 2 percent were medium-sized enter-
prises with 50-249 employees. On average, participating firms had 7.49. Compared to our sample of 
non-participants, there is a considerable size difference. In fact, non-participants were almost twice 
the size of participants with 12.74 employees. This size difference is also reflected in the distribution 
of firms within the three firm size categories. As discussed above, our sample represents 26% of total 
Bulgarian firms. While participants in our sample correspond very much to the average Bulgarian firm 
in terms of firm size (7.2 employees), non-participants tend to be larger. 
In terms of sectoral breakdown, about half (49 percent) of the microcredit is lent to trade companies 
(NACE section ‘wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles’), 17 percent into the manufactur-
ing sector, and 10 percent into transportation. Real Estate activities and hotels/restaurants represent-
ed only 7 and 5 percent of the participants respectively. Other sectors such as agriculture or construc-
tion had a share of less than 5 percent each within the group of participating firms. Relative to non-
participants, participants were more concentrated in trade, transportation and hotel/restaurant sectors. 
Non-participating firms on the other hand had a higher share within agriculture, construction and real 
estate businesses. For micro-enterprises, it is not surprising that a large share is in trade and other 
service sectors. As a consequence, the slightly higher share of participating firms in these sectors 
could simply be a firm size effect. 
When considering location, we present clusters of economic development. The 28 districts of Bulgaria 
are ranked according to their level of economic performance based on a composite index of different 
indicators and then clustered into five groups. 13 percent of the participants were concentrated in 
areas with very good economic development, 31 percent in areas with good development, 25 percent 
with average, 19 percent with unsatisfactory and 12 percent with weak economic development. In 
comparison to non-participants, participating firms were geographically more equally distributed 
across the different clusters. Non-participating firms were more concentrated in areas with ‘good’ eco-
nomic development. The more even spread of participating firms in terms of location can be interpret-
ed as a sign for the microcredit program’s objective to broadly increase access to finance in a devel-
opment-oriented manner instead of exclusively selecting the economically most promising locations. 
In total, ProCredit Bank Bulgaria was present with a branch by the end of 2004 in 19 out of 28 Bulgar-
                                                   
17 Note that a self-employed firm owner is also counted as employee, so that the minimum number of employees 
is 1. Zero employees means that a firm went out of business as discussed above. 
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ian districts, while we have observations for non-participants from all of the districts. This fact is graph-
ically illustrated in Figure 1 and will be later exploited in Section 5.4 for estimating heterogeneous 
program effects. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
As for the type of ownership, 44 percent of the participating firms were limited partnerships. 31 per-
cent were public joint-stock companies and 24 percent were limited liability companies. A very small 
number of 1 percent were state enterprises and even less were general partnerships. Non-
participants have a slightly higher share of general partnerships and state enterprises. Moreover, non-
participants are less often limited partnerships, but instead more often limited liability companies than 
participating firms. While in a limited partnership at least one managing partner must bear liability for 
the partnership's actions, in a limited liability company all owners are protected from financial liability, 
regardless of whether they play an active role in the direction of the company. The higher share of 
limited partnerships among participants compared to non-participants could reflect preference of the 
microcredit program for borrowers which have to bear liability for their firm. 
Gender of firm owners is finally very similar for both groups of participants and non-participants. If we 
disregard observations without information on gender of firm owners which is more common among 
non-participants, then for both participating and non-participating firms about 75 percent are owned by 
male and 25 percent by female entrepreneurs. 
The fact that participating and non-participating firms apparently differ in their characteristics at the 
start of the microcredit program implies that we should control for these difference when comparing 
the two groups. At the same time, participating firms do not seem to be a totally different group of 
firms than are non-participating ones. To have a sufficient amount of non-participants that are inher-
ently similar to participants in relevant ways, is favorable for finding good matches for participants, 
next to the fact of a merely large number of non-participants relative to participants. 
In Table 4 we also report our main outcome of interest which is the change in number of employees 
for participants and non-participants from before treatment (2003) to after treatment (2006). As we 
investigate the growth of small firms, we focus on absolute rather than relative change at this stage. 
Indicators with very low values obviously have a greater tendency to produce large relative change, 
even when the absolute change is small. Even more important, different base values of indicators will 
lead to different relative changes even if the absolute change is identical. Applied to our sample with 
an average firm size before treatment of 7.492 for participants and 12.737 for (unmatched) non-
participants, an absolute increase of 2 employees would translate into a relative increase of 27 per-
cent for participants, but only a 16 percent for non-participants. As shown at the bottom of Table 4, 
employment grows over time for participating firms whereas it decreases for non-participants. In de-
tail, participants have on average 2.73 more employees two years after treatment, while non-
participants shrank on average by -0.18 employees over the same time period. We hence observe a 
considerable raw difference in the development of employees between participants and non-
participants. However, these are descriptives only and we do not yet know if the gap is caused by the 
treatment with microcredit or by differences in key characteristics of the firms. 
4 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSAL EFFECTS 
For estimating the causal effect of microcredit on wage-employment we use a treatment effects meth-
odology for observational data with non-random assignment of treatment. Our purpose is to account 
for possible selection biases in order to better identify the counterfactual of how employment in partic-
ipating firms would have grown in the absence of their participation in the program. A typical bias for 
microcredit programs arises from self-selection, when firm-owners with better entrepreneurial skills 
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select themselves into the program. But self-selection bias can also go the other way round, when a 
firm-owner borrows because he has experienced, or expects to experience, a negative shock. Anoth-
er source of bias for microfinance stems from program selection. Again the bias can go in either direc-
tion. As Banerjee, Karlan, et al. (2015) suggest, lenders choose which markets to enter, and depend-
ing on their motivation may thus select relatively vibrant and growing markets (because of profitability) 
or stagnant and poor ones (because of social concerns). ProCredit Bank rather belonged to the first 
group of lenders with a preference for clients with growth perspectives. The very rapid expansion of its 
operations on the other hand (from about 1,000 to 20,000 loans from 2001 to 2004 and from 7 to 35 
branches) can be taken as indication that this strategy could only be implemented to a limited extent. 
The even spread of branches across differently developed economic regions additionally points into 
the same direction. Moreover, as M. Brown et al. (2011) show that only 5 percent of firms which ap-
plied for a loan in Eastern Europe in 2004 were rejected, program selection does not seem too acute 
in our context. Nonetheless, as descriptive statistics showed, characteristics of participants are differ-
ent from those of non-participants already before participating in the program and some of the change 
in employees might rather be attributable to these differences rather than the microcredit program. 
To minimize the effect of selection biases on our results, we use propensity score matching (see 
Rubin, 1974; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983 and 1985 for conceptual foundations). The basic idea is to 
find non-participants which are similar to participants in relevant pre-treatment characteristics. That 
being done, we attribute differences in outcomes between participants and matched non-participants 
to the program. Matching has become a well-established approach for treatment evaluations. In the 
area of microcredit it was for example used by Chemin (2008) or Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) to 
reassess datasets which had already been analyzed with methods that accounted less for selection 
biases. The re-estimated impact with matching was typically found to be lower. 
Methodological issues for propensity score matching are discussed in detail by Becker and Ichino 
(2002), Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008); Dehejia and Wahba (2002) or Smith and Todd (2005). We first 
of all need to rely on the conditional independence assumption. It implies that systematic differences 
in outcomes between participants and non-participants with the same values for covariates are at-
tributable to the program, that is ܻ଴,ܻଵ	┴	D|X. Y0 indicates that a firm does not participate in the micro-
credit program, Y1 means that a firm participates in the program, ┴ denotes independence, D is the 
indicator for program participation and X a set of observable covariates which are not affected by 
program participation. In other words, there is no more bias from omitted variables once X is included. 
This clearly is a strong assumption. It will be justified by additionally applying a difference-in-
differences approach to further control for differences in time-invariant characteristics. Moreover, we 
test the sensitivity of our results to unobserved covariates. A second assumption is that participation 
probabilities lie in the same domain. This is called the common support assumption and can be ex-
pressed as 0 < P(D = 1|X) < 1. It implies that for each participant there is a non-participant with a 
similar X. We impose the common support condition in all of our analyses. 
Conditioning on all relevant covariates is limited in the case of a high dimensional vector X. When the 
number of covariates increases, the chances of finding a match reduces. Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) showed that instead participants may be matched with non-participants using a summary 
measure of similarity in the form of a propensity score rather than the entire set of covariates. Let 
P(Xi) be the probability that unit i is assigned to the participating group, conditional on characteristics 
Xi, and X is the multidimensional vector of pre-treatment characteristics or time-invariant stable firm 
characteristics, and define 	P( ௜ܺ 	) 	≡ 	Pr(ܦ௜ 	= 	1	|	 ௜ܺ) 	= 	E(ܦ௜ 	|	 ௜ܺ 	) 
Given that the conditional independence and common support assumptions hold, the PSM estimator 
for our parameter of interest ATT (average treatment effect on the treated) can then be written as 
߂௉ௌெ
஺்் = ܧ(ܻଵ|	ܲ(ܺ),ܦ = 1) −ܧ(ܻ଴|	ܲ(ܺ),ܦ = 0)       (1) 
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where the first term can be estimated from the group of participants and the second term from the 
matched non-participants. 
As we have panel data and both pre- and post-program information on the outcome variable, we can 
extend this standard approach by a difference-in-differences (DiD) matching estimator as suggested 
by Heckman et al. (1997). The ATT can then be written as 
߂௉ௌெି஽௜஽
஺்் = ܧ ቀ ௧ܻೌ೑೟೐ೝଵ − ௧್ܻ೐೑೚ೝ೐ଵ |ܲ(ܺ),ܦ = 1ቁ − ܧ ቀ ௧ܻೌ೑೟೐ೝ଴ − ௧್ܻ೐೑೚ೝ೐଴ |ܲ(ܺ),ܦ = 0ቁ   (2) 
where tafter is the post-treatment and tbefore the pre-treatment period.  
An important advantage of using a DiD estimator is that it allows us not only to avoid the bias caused 
by observables as controlled for by standard propensity score matching, but also by time-invariant 
unobservables (as empirically shown by Heckman et al., 1997; Smith and Todd, 2005). In fact, we are 
even able to control for unobservables that may vary in time, but affect participating and non-
participating firms in the same way as for instance inflation or business cycles. This assumes of 
course that in absence of the program both groups would have the same trend in outcomes. In our 
main analysis we use the year 2003 for matching on pre-program trends. In additional estimations for 
sub-samples we can show that participants and matched non-participants already developed in a 
similar manner in terms of firm size several years before treatment (see Figure 3). 
4.2 ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
We estimate the propensity score by means of a probit model18 for program participation. Choosing 
the observable variables according to which matching is performed constitutes a critical step. We are 
guided by previous research and the specific context of our program. In the literature some disagree-
ment exists over the number of covariates to include. Rubin and Thomas (1996) recommend to better 
include a variable if there are doubts about whether it is related to the outcome or not. On the other 
hand including too many variables might exacerbate the problem of finding an area of common sup-
port. Against this background, we start with a simple specification, that is firm size, sector and location 
as most evaluations of firm support do. Next, we iteratively add variables, break them down into more 
detailed categories, test logarithmic expressions instead of levels, squares or interactions. While we 
try to retain a high number of sample observations, ultimately, the model needs to satisfy the balanc-
ing properties as discussed in more detail below. We use the following variables in our base specifica-
tion: firm size in terms of both absolute number of employees and twelve different categories.19 Indus-
try is divided into fifty-eight categories based on NACE codes. For geographic location we use the 
twenty-eight districts of Bulgaria. We add dummy variables for ownership type and gender of owner. 
For a reduced sample, we additionally estimate a model including further covariates (sales, profit and 
productivity) and pre-program information backwards until the year 2000. It should be noted that all 
covariates were collected before participation in the program (at year-end 2003) to avoid the program 
affecting the firm’s characteristics used to simulate the selection process.  
In a next step, we carry out the matching for all pairwise combinations. This is not fully straightfor-
ward, because the likelihood of observing two units with exactly the same propensity score is in prin-
ciple zero, since P(X) is a continuous variable. Various matching methods have consequently been 
proposed to overcome this problem. We test the four most widely used ones (nearest neighbor, cali-
per, radius and kernel matching). The nearest-neighbor matching method assigns a weight equal to 
one, takes each participant in turn and identifies the non-participant with the closest propensity score. 
It can be implemented with replacement, so that a non-participant can be used more than once as a 
match. This increases the average quality of the matches, but it can lead to higher variance for the 
                                                   
18 Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) show that logit and probit models yield similar results for binary treatments.  
19 We use the following firm size categories: 1-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-
99, and 100-249 employees. 
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estimated ATT. Although intuitive, the nearest-neighbor technique must be considered very carefully, 
since it will find a nearest neighbor even with a very different propensity score, if there is no closer 
unit. The caliper matching method instead chooses the nearest-neighbor within a caliper of a certain 
bandwidth and thus imposes a quality control on the match by setting a tolerance level on the maxi-
mum propensity score distance. A variant of caliper matching is referred to as radius matching with 
the idea to use not only the nearest-neighbor but all non-participants within the caliper. Kernel match-
ing also uses all non-participants. The kernel is a function that weighs the contribution of each non-
participant, so that more importance is attached to those non-participants providing a better match.  
With either method we ensure that the matching procedure balances the distribution of observable 
variables between participants and non-participants. A participant and a matched non-participant 
might both have the same propensity scores, but this does not guarantee that they are similar in a 
relevant way: one firm might for instance be active in a sector with a high propensity for program par-
ticipation, but from a location with a low participation propensity, while for another firm with a similar 
propensity score it might just be the other way round. We perform several balancing tests: First, we 
test that each variable has the same mean in the group of participants and non-participants. To this 
end, two-sided t-tests of equal means are conducted before (unmatched) and after matching 
(matched). A second test is on pseudo-R². Its basic idea is to re-estimate the propensity score on the 
matched sample, that is only on participants and matched non-participants, and compare the pseudo-
R²s before and after matching. A successful matching should lead to a low pseudo-R². Third, we test 
the Likelihood-ratio (LR) on the joint significance of all regressors in the probit model. The hypothesis 
we test is that the variables in the probit estimation have no explanatory power after matching. Finally, 
we also check the mean standardized bias as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) defined as 
the percentage of the square root of the average sample variances in both groups. If balance is not 
achieved, we need to revise the model until we attain balance. 
5 RESULTS 
5.1 PROPENSITY SCORE ESTIMATION 
The probit estimation results for participation probability are presented in Table 5.20 We briefly discuss 
the main components that influence the selection into treatment. The binary outcome takes a value of 
one if a firm receives a microloan from the program. As expected, firm size affects the probability of 
program participation. The smaller a firm, the more likely it participates in the program. Sectors jointly 
have a significant influence on participation, but single sectors also influence selection into treatment. 
In particular, being active in wholesale trade, water transport, financial intermediation as well as elec-
tricity, gas and hot water supply positively influences the probability of participation. Location in terms 
of districts jointly influences participation. At the same time, regional provenance from the majority of 
districts also has a significant influence. Finally, ownership type and gender of owner contributes to 
explaining participation in the program. The pseudo R2 of the estimation is 0.095. Note also that the 
number of observations has decreased from 61,006 to 58,665 compared to the original sample in 
Table 4. This is caused by the exclusion of some non-participants from the probit estimation that were 
active in sectors and districts where there are no participants to be compared to.  
(Table 5 about here) 
We next impose the common support assumption by dropping treated observations whose propensity 
score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum score of the untreated. This method is 
                                                   
20 We use the Stata module PSMATCH2 developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) for matching. 
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also described by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) as ‘Minima and Maxima Comparison’.21 As indicated 
in Table 6, this results in 4 out of 974 participants that are off support because their propensity scores 
are larger than the maximum scores for non-participants. As for minima, no participant has a lower 
propensity score than any non-participant, and we do not need to drop any further observations. In 
sum, there is a very substantial region of overlap, and the estimated effect on the remaining firms in 
terms of support can be viewed as representative of the full sample. 
(Table 6 about here) 
The balancing tests discussed earlier furthermore show that the matching is successful. Table 7 
summarizes the different quality measures after applying caliper matching. First, we test whether each 
variable has the same mean for participants and non-participants. The t-tests are conducted before 
and after matching. We clearly see when looking at the first and second column of mean values in 
Table 7 that the unmatched participants and non-participants had very different characteristics. How-
ever, after matching, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the means are equal between the two 
groups. In fact, we can see that more than half (48 out of 87) of the variables have a mean that is 
significantly different between participants and non-participants at the 10 percent level before match-
ing takes place, given the p-value in the last column for the two-sided t-test. In the matched sample in 
turn, we find no significant differences at all. Next to the mean values, we also show the percentage 
reduction of bias, which is the relative reduction of the difference in mean values for a covariate. It 
shows that matching reduces the relative bias for all covariates. This result of the t-test of equal 
means indicates that matching has been successful. The second test is for pseudo-R². A successful 
matching should lead to a low pseudo-R². At the bottom of Table 7, we indicate that the pseudo-R² 
decreased substantially after matching from 0.095 to 0.012. Third, the p-value of 1.000 for the test of 
the LR statistics shows that it cannot be rejected that the variables in the probit estimation have no 
explanatory power after matching. Finally, it can be seen that the mean standardized bias declines 
from initially 7.8 percent to 2.1 percent after matching, where a value below 3 to 5 percent generally 
indicates the success of the matching approach. To summarize, it can be noted that our matching 
passes all balancing tests. We can proceed to estimating treatment effects. 
(Table 7 about here) 
5.2 MAIN TREATMENT EFFECT 
We estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) as defined in Eq. (2) for the main eval-
uation period until the end of the second year after treatment, 2006. Our outcome variable is the 
change in number of employees since 2003 before treatment. In Table 8, we report results based on 
a caliper matching technique with a bandwidth of 0.05. Most important, the results show that the pro-
gram had a very positive and statistically significant effect on the change in employees for participat-
ing firms. To be precise, the participating firms had on average 2.480 more employees after receiving 
a microcredit than matched non-participants. Observing each group separately, participants increased 
by 2.722 employees after treatment, while matched non-participants only grew by 0.241 employees. 
Relative to the number of employees before treatment – participants had 7.478 employees on aver-
age in 2003 – this translates into a growth difference in terms of firm size of 33 percent for participants 
compared to matched non-participants.  
A look at the absolute number of employees before treatment in 2003 and after the main evaluation 
period in 2006, as shown in the lower part of Table 8, complements the picture. First, it reveals that 
while the difference in firm size in 2003 was large between the two groups before matching (12.497 
                                                   
21 Another option to impose common support is to use a trimming procedure whereby a certain percentage of the 
treated observations are dropped for which the propensity score density of the untreated is the lowest. For our 
analysis, both minima and maxima comparison as well as trimming produces similar results. 
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for unmatched non-participants), matching was successful in identifying a group of comparable non-
participants with a similar firm size (7.478 for matched participants and 7.087 for matched non-
participants). Secondly, it shows that unmatched non-participants slightly shrank from 12.497 employ-
ees to 12.451 employees over the period 2003 to 2006. At the same time, microcredit participants 
grew from 7.478 to 10.200 employees, while the matched non-participants grew from 7.087 to 7.328. 
In sum, microcredit considerably and significantly increased employment two years after treatment, 
while the average sample firm did not grow. 
(Table 8 about here) 
For comparison, we also present results for other matching algorithms in Table 9.22 As can be seen, 
the results from all matching estimators are significant and essentially have the same implications. 
The main ATT for change in employees until 2006 ranges from 2.280 employees based on nearest 
neighbor matching without replacement to 2.667 employees based on kernel matching with a band-
width of 0.05 and a Gaussian weighting function. The closeness of results from different matching 
algorithms is not surprising according to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). With a growing sample size, 
all matching estimators become closer to comparing only exact matches and should yield the same 
results. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) even argue that the choice of matching algorithms is not as crucial 
as the proper estimation of the propensity scores. Nevertheless, finding similar results across different 
parameters serves as a first robustness check and strengthens our confidence in the results.  
(Table 9 about here) 
5.3 DYNAMIC EFFECTS 
While the previous results estimate the ATT for the main evaluation period until 2006, we now focus 
on analyzing the dynamic pattern of treatment effects. In other words, our interest is to disentangle 
the effect of the program to understand if it is constant or varies over time. We are able to do so be-
cause information on the number of employees is available for several years after treatment. In addi-
tion, we can track firm exits in our dataset and hence control for sample attrition over a considerable 
time span. Table 10 provides results of the estimated ATT for each year after treatment until 2010. It 
also shows the yearly development of absolute employee numbers for participants, matched non-
participants and the full sample of non-participants, which is, in addition, graphically illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. Since the number of observations varies slightly per year depending on the availability of infor-
mation, we indicate sample size in the last two rows of Table 10. Note, also, that estimates are again 
very similar across different matching algorithms. 
(Table 10 and Figure 2 about here) 
As Table 10 and Figure 2 show, the loan effects are substantially positive and long lasting, as signifi-
cant differences between the participating and matched non-participating firms are maintained several 
years after reception of the microcredit. A largely positive and statistically significant effect already 
takes place in the treatment year 2004 with a difference of 2.598 more employees for microcredit 
participants. The strong program effect lessens towards 2005 to a difference of 1.289, before recover-
ing in 2006 with 2.480. Afterwards, the impact even further increases to 2.964 in 2007 and 3.803 in 
2008 before it decreases to 2.040 in 2009. In 2010, the last available point in time in our dataset and 
six years after treatment, the ATT still amounts to 2.110. 
What attracts attention is the remarkable dip in treatment effect for 2005. As can be seen in the sec-
ond column of Table 10, the microcredit participants first grow strongly from a baseline size of 7.478 
                                                   
22 According to Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) bootstrapping of standard errors is not valid for matching estima-
tors with a fixed number of matches such as nearest-neighbor and caliper matching. It is likely that the prob-
lems invalidating the bootstrap disappear if the number of matches increases with sample size. We therefore 
bootstrapped standard errors with 50 replications for the kernel matching results only. 
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in 2003 to 10.286 employees until the end of the treatment year in 2004. Afterward they contract to 
8.790 employees in 2005 before recovering to 10.200 in 2006. During the same time period, the 
matched and unmatched non-participants more or less stagnate at 7.087-7.328 employees and 
12.07-12.497 employees, respectively, as shown in the third and fourth column of Table 10. The de-
velopment of non-participants is in line with an economic context during that period that did not give 
reason for notable yearly changes. Moreover, the increase and subsequent drop in employees also 
does not mirror the underlying business fundamentals of participants. Financial indicators on sales 
and profit for participants show constant growth over the period 2003 to 2006.23 There is no dip for 
financials in 2005 as is the case for employee numbers. We thus suppose that the dramatic upward 
and downward development of firm size for microcredit participants is rather to be explained by the 
program itself. In anticipation or immediately after disbursement of the microcredit, participating firms 
largely expanded their businesses in terms of employees within the year of treatment, 2004. Presum-
ably, this increase was oversized and unsustainable with regard to underlying business fundamentals, 
as financials did not increase to the same degree. This consequently triggered a clear contraction in 
terms of employees within the first year after treatment, 2005, although the average firm size re-
mained higher than before treatment. As with the previous increase, the decrease was again dispro-
portional compared to the financials, and the average firm size for participants settles down at an 
apparent equilibrium of 10.200 employees in 2006. Another conjecture for the dip in 2005 would be 
that the expansion into new business areas as enabled by the microloan required a larger number of 
employees in 2004 than in 2005, when new business processes had become more efficient and more 
experienced employees needed less time to perform the same tasks. Either way, it seems desirable 
to consider an evaluation period of several years after treatment for microfinance programs in order to 
allow treatment effects on firm size to stabilize. 
Another noticeable development that is mirrored in the dynamic treatment effects is the impact of the 
global economic crisis. If we look at the numbers of employees in Table 10, we see that after several 
years of growth, 2009 marks a clear drop in firm size. Most plausibly, this reduction of employees is to 
be explained by the economic downturn that followed the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. The 
crisis was manifested in the downward movement of GDP as well as employment in the Bulgarian 
economy in the last quarter of 2008. GDP shrank by around 5 percent, and unemployment jumped in 
2009. As studies by Wagner and Winkler (2013) show, microfinance institutions have been no less 
vulnerable to the crisis than other financial institutions. While the crisis negatively affected both partic-
ipants and non-participants, there is a difference in timing. Unmatched non-participants in our dataset 
start contracting in terms of firm size one year earlier in 2008 than do participants and matched non-
participants. One conjecture for this earlier sensitivity of the average Bulgarian firm to the economic 
shock is that microcredit clients and their matched comparators are more growth oriented and with-
stand economic pressures longer than other firms. The time lag in decreasing firm sizes could also be 
related to the unmatched firms originating from sectors and locations that are less resistant to crises.  
5.4 HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS 
In the following, we take a closer look at the heterogeneity of the estimated treatment effect. We re-
estimate the ATT for various sub-groups of our sample. In particular, we are interested if different loan 
and firm sizes influence effects of microcredit on wage-employment. In addition, we also investigate 
heterogeneous effects based on loan purposes and firm location. The results are summarized in Ta-
ble 11. Note that we show the ATT both in terms of absolute change in the number of employees as 
well as in terms of relative change compared to the baseline number of employees. For sub-groups 
with very different baselines, it is helpful to have information on both. 
                                                   
23 Sales increase from 172 Thousand Euros (2003) to 193 TEUR (2004) to 234 TEUR (2005) to 295 TEUR 
(2006). Profit increases from 86 TEUR (2003) to 108 TEUR (2004), 129 TEUR (2005) and 119 TEUR (2006). 
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5.4.1 LOAN AMOUNT 
We first investigate whether the effect of microcredit varies with loan size. As argued in the beginning, 
existing studies point into the direction that larger loans have a more positive impact on wage-
employment than smaller loans. There might even exist a certain minimum loan amount necessary for 
positive wage-employment effects to unfold. In order to test this hypothesis we conducted our pro-
pensity score matching analysis for three equally large sub-groups of participants based on loan 
amount: small (< EUR 2,000 EUR), medium (EUR 2,000 – 6,000) and large (> EUR 6,000). Since 
some participants received more than one loan during treatment, loan amounts reflect the total 
amount of loans disbursed in 2004 per client. As can be seen in Table 11, the impact of all three size 
categories of microcredit is significant, positive and very similar. The ATT is 27.6 percent for small, 
30.0 percent for medium and 25.0 percent for large program loans. We consequently do not find any 
evidence that larger loans unfold larger effects. At the same time, our smallest loan size category is 
already considerably above the average loan amount for other regions. Loans up to EUR 2,000 at 
market exchange rates would be equivalent to USD 6,650 at purchasing power parity. We therefore 
tested the hypothesis again for loan amounts between EUR 500-1,000 (USD 1,664 – 3,328 PPP ad-
justed) as well as below EUR 500 (USD 1,664 PPP adjusted). With regard to loans between EUR 
500-1,000 the estimated effect is significant at the 10% level and again similar to that for larger loan 
amounts (23.9 percent). As far as loans below EUR 500 are concerned, we also find a similar but 
insignificant effect (26.8 percent). The number of sample firms with very small loans is too small for 
carrying out reliable estimates. This is also the reason why we cannot assess the impact of yet small-
er loan amounts which would have been very interesting as loan sizes of existing impact assessments 
range between USD 726-1,616 PPP adjusted. Therefore, while we do not find evidence, that larger 
loans have a more positive impact, our dataset with a large average loan size and a very small num-
ber of participants with loans below EUR 500 might also be ill-suited for testing such a hypothesis. 
(Table 11 about here) 
5.4.2 FIRM SIZE 
We next investigate whether the effect of microcredit varies with firm size. Empirical evidence as dis-
cussed in section 2 shows that the smaller a firm, the less access it has to formal bank loans. The 
more a firm is constrained by credit, the higher the relative impact of microcredit on its growth should 
consequently be. We use the typical firm size categories micro (1-9 employees), small (10-49) and 
medium (50-249). The results in Table 11 confirm findings from other studies: The smaller a firm, the 
higher the impact of microcredit on employee growth. Micro-sized firms have on average an ATT of 
50.4 percent more employees for participants than non-participants in 2006 compared to 2003. Small-
sized participating firms increase by 24.3 percent more over the same time period, while the treatment 
effect for medium-sized firms is even negative but insignificant due to the small number of observa-
tions for medium-sized participants. 
5.4.3 LOAN PURPOSES 
An additional analysis is based on different loan purposes. The bank distinguishes between loans for 
working capital and investment. Working capital refers to current or short-term assets to be used with-
in one year (e.g., wood for carpentry or food and goods for retail vending). Investment loans are those 
made for the purchase of fixed assets that are used over time of the business. These assets typically 
have a life span of more than one year, such as machinery, equipment or property. Loans for invest-
ments in fixed assets are generally larger and have longer terms than working capital loans. Since the 
productive activity does not directly use up the fixed asset (that is, it is not sold as part of the product), 
economic theory suggests that the impact of investment loans upon profitability (and business expan-
sion in terms of employees) is felt over a longer period of time (Ledgerwood, 2013). The impact of 
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working capital loans, on the other hand, is supposed to show instantaneously and diminish over time. 
Our dataset largely supports this hypothesis. The estimated impact in 2006 of 2.301 for working capi-
tal loans and 1.799 for investment loans in Table 11 points to the more immediate impact of working 
capital over investment loans. A longer-term perspective however shows that from 2008 onwards the 
relation reverses, and investment loans have a higher impact than working capital loans (2.932 in 
2008, 2.972 in 2009 and 2.040 in 2010 for investment loans compared to 1.627 in 2008, 1.054 in 
2009 and 1.608 in 2010 for working capital loans). The indicated impact for working capital loans from 
2008 onwards furthermore becomes insignificant. Although it remains debatable for how long after 
treatment an impact can be attributed to the original microloan, the findings suggest that the period 
over which loans display their impact is affected by the loan purpose. It therefore seems advisable to 
take the type of loan purpose into consideration when deciding over the appropriate evaluation period 
for microfinance impact assessments. In addition, our findings do not add support to the frequently 
made caveat that because money is fungible (e.g., Banerjee, Duflo, et al., 2015; Ledgerwood, 2013), 
loans intended for a specific purpose are often used for a different purpose within a household or 
business.  
5.4.4 LOCATION 
Finally, we make use of the fact that the microcredit program was not present in all Bulgarian districts 
at the time of treatment. As Figure 1 shows, ProCredit Bank Bulgaria had branches in 19 out of 28 
Bulgarian districts during treatment in 2004. Observations for non-participants are available for all 28 
districts. We now exploit this institutional feature of the program by including only firms from the 9 
districts without program presence as potential comparators in the matching regressions. It should be 
noted that we had to drop 28 of the 974 participants because they were located in districts with no 
actual presence of the program but still participated. Overall, propensity score matching again results 
in a significantly positive ATT of an increase in employees of 2.396 more for participants than for non-
participants from districts without the program. Receiving a similar ATT to our main estimation when 
matching on a sample of non-participants from areas without the program is an important finding with 
regard to our research design. For areas without program presence, we have good reason to believe 
that access to alternative credit (a concern addressed in section 2) was in general much more limited 
than in program areas. This is the case because ProCredit Bank followed a typical strategy for finan-
cial institutions by focusing on operationally more accessible areas first. Hence, it is very likely that 
other providers of microcredit also had limited presence in areas without the program. Obtaining an 
ATT of 2.396, which is similar to the ATT of 2.480 from our main estimation, supports our hypothesis 
that in general, little alternative credit was available for non-participants in both program and non-
program areas. 
In sum, the purpose of this section was to investigate which sub-groups of our sample have experi-
enced enhanced growth as a result of microcredit. This way we were able to test several hypotheses: 
We first tested whether larger microloans have stronger impacts on wage-employment. We do not find 
evidence for this hypothesis which might however be due to the relatively large loan amounts by the 
assessed program. The number of very small microloans is too limited for fully testing the hypothesis. 
We additionally assessed if smaller firms are more constrained by credit than larger firms. We can 
confirm this hypothesis as the treatment effect increases with decreasing firm size. Moreover, our 
findings point to the fact that the periods over which loans display their impact is affected by the pur-
pose of the loan. Working capital loans show a more immediate effect, while loans for investment 
purposes increase their impact over time. Finally, we are able to show that restricting the sample of 
non-participants to areas without program presence results in similar treatment effects as those from 
our main estimation. This finding supports our hypothesis that alternative credit to non-participants 
was still limited during the period of evaluation, increasing confidence in our research design.  
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6 SENSITIVITY TESTS 
After having presented strong positive effects of the program, we test the robustness of our results. 
The advantage of well-performed matching is that it can account for selection on observables. If par-
ticipation in microcredit can be understood with observable variables, then matching produces con-
sistent results. To add further strength to our estimates in this regard, we will test the appropriateness 
of the specified model and its sensitivity to small variations. In addition, we will compare our main 
results with propensity score matching to treatment effects estimated through a linear regression 
model with ordinary least squares. 
Even if selection on observables is well accounted for, one major drawback of matching in contrast to 
randomized experiments remains nevertheless: selection on unobservables is not controlled for. By 
complementing propensity score matching with difference-in-differences, we try to control for any pre-
existing constant (time-invariant) differences in the outcome variable before treatment, even if those 
differences are caused by unobservable attributes. Still, participants and non-participants could differ 
in terms of time-variant unobserved characteristics. This would violate the conditional independence 
assumption and bias our results. It is not possible to directly test the conditional independence as-
sumption and the magnitude of selection bias with our non-experimental data. We can however as-
sess the sensitivity of our results to remaining unobservables and will do so by applying three types of 
analyses: a recently developed test of exogeneity by G. Caetano et al., 2016, the so-called bounding 
approach as suggested by Rosenbaum (2005) and simulation analyses as applied by Ichino et al. 
(2008).  
(Table 12 and Figure 3 about here) 
6.1 VARIATIONS WITHIN MATCHING PROCESS 
To start with, an initial robustness check in terms of variation within the matching process was already 
built in our presentation of main results. We jointly considered different matching methods in Table 9. 
The fact that matching with different methods such as caliper, nearest neighbor, radius and kernel 
estimators produces very similar results, is a positive sign for robustness. Here, we additionally ex-
tend the set of variables in the propensity score estimation in order to see whether this has an impact 
on the causal estimates. As discussed above, data for sales and profit as well as historical trends 
before start of the treatment in 2003 are only available for a limited amount of sample firms. We con-
sequently restricted our main specification to variables which allow for a large sample size. Now, we 
make use of this additional information.  
First, we go further backwards in time, so as to match on longer trends before start of the treatment. 
The point of reference is the base ATT for change in employees until 2006 of 2.480 as shown in the 
first row of Table 12. Adding information on the number of employees for 2002, 2001 and 2000, that is 
until 3 years before start of the treatment, increases the estimated program effect to 2.768 compared 
to baseline results. Using the change in employees from 2003 compared to 2000 instead as further 
variable for matching, this results in an ATT of 3.057. Here is an important point to make: the inclusion 
of longer time trends not only confirms the positive effect of microcredit from our main estimates. It 
additionally allows us to show for a sub-sample that participants and matched non-participants devel-
oped almost identically in terms of firm size for several years before treatment. After treatment, only 
participants start to grow considerably while matched non-participants stagnate. This strongly sup-
ports our hypothesis that the increase in firm size for participants compared to otherwise identical 
matched non-participants (based on observable characteristics) is causally related to treatment with 
microcredit. Figure 3 graphically illustrates this fact for the period 2000 until 2006 based on an exten-
sion of the specification for propensity score estimation by the change in employee numbers from 
2003 compared to 2000 (Δ N employees 2003 – N employees 2000). The sub-sample consists of 331 
participants and 34,052 non-participants (compared to 970 and 57,691 respectively for base effects). 
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The finding that participants and their matched non-participants had a very similar development of firm 
size before treatment finally also relates to the applied difference-in-differences method. It adds sup-
port to our assumption that in absence of the program both participants and non-participants would 
have the same trend in the outcome variable. 
We furthermore assess how the inclusion of additional variables for the baseline year 2003 influences 
results. If we use information on sales, profit and productivity (defined as sales per employee) in 2003 
for propensity score matching, the impact increases to 2.780. Finally, we modify the specification with 
regard to geographic location. As Heckman et al. (1997) show, geographical mismatch of participants 
and non-participants is typically a large source of bias in impact studies. As a consequence, we here 
exactly match on district by only including matches of participants and non-participants that are identi-
cal in terms of district. It should be noted that we already use districts as covariate for the estimation 
of propensity scores in our main sample. Many matches used for estimating the base effect therefore 
already fulfill this condition. If we now explicitly force an exact match on location by district, the effect 
amounts to a significant increase of 1.691 more employees in 2006 for participants compared to be-
fore treatment which is about in the same range as the base effect of 2.480.  
6.2 OLS ESTIMATES 
As another robustness test, we compare our main results with propensity score matching (PSM) to 
treatment effects estimated through a linear regression model with ordinary least squares (OLS). Both 
methods are supposed to produce similar results, although PSM has two particular advantages com-
pared to OLS according to Chemin (2008). First, matching compares a participant to a synthetic non-
participant only if it is comparable enough, that is in the area of common support. A regression with 
OLS on the other hand will give a result by interpolating a linear relationship between the two groups, 
no matter if participants and non-participants are very different. This is an undesirable result if the two 
groups are not comparable. Second, the matching technique is non-parametric as opposed to a linear 
regression which imposes a linear structure on the data. Matching does not impose a particular struc-
ture and heterogeneous treatment effects are allowed for. 
Table 13 summarizes the OLS estimates for different models and compares them to results from 
PSM. We first estimate a model without control variables, i. e. with only a constant and the treatment 
variable, while the second model includes all covariates in OLS which were also used for estimating 
the propensity score. In addition, we performed the OLS estimation for two types of samples: the full 
sample with all available non-participants (61,006 observations) and the reduced sample with those 
non-participants that were used for matching (58,665 observations). The full sample uses more infor-
mation, whereas the reduced sample should provide a better approximation of the ATT with PSM. 
(Table 13 about here) 
As expected, the results before matching (without controls) as shown in the first column of Table 13 
are very similar for PSM and OLS. If we look at the matched sample only, the estimates for PSM and 
OLS are identical with a change of 2.770 in employees when no observable differences between par-
ticipants and non-participants are accounted for. When we compare our main results from PSM after 
matching to the OLS estimates with controls in the second column, we receive a lower, but still con-
siderable and significant ATT for OLS on the matched sample of 1.887 which further points to the 
robustness of our results.  
6.3 EXOGENEITY TEST, BOUNDING AND SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
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We first apply a recently developed test of exogeneity by C. Caetano (2015)24 to assess the sensitivity 
of our results to unobservables. This test has power when unobservable confounders are discontinu-
ous with respect to the explanatory variable of interest, and it is particularly suitable for applications in 
which that variable has bunching points. 
Applied to our context, we assume that change in employees is a continuous function of microloans. 
For this purpose, we use loan amount as explanatory variable instead of the binary treatment assign-
ment. While the 974 participants receive a continuous amount of euros, the 60,032 non-participants 
receive zero euros of loan. Loan amount therefore bunches at zero euros. If now the expected 
change in employees conditional on loan amount is discontinuous at zero, this cannot be due to loan 
amount, since loan amount has a continuous effect on the number of employees. This discontinuity 
may rather be due to selection on observable and unobservable firm characteristics which may be 
discontinuous at a loan amount of zero. If we control for observable characteristics and the number of 
employees is no longer discontinuous, we fail to reject exogeneity. If on the other hand the discontinu-
ity remains after observables are included, the only explanation is that there is at least one unob-
served confounder and hence the model suffers from endogeneity. 
Figure 4 compares results with and without controlling for observable characteristics. The left graph 
indeed shows a discontinuity of the outcome at a loan amount of zero compared to a loan amount of 
EUR 1-500 (smallest loan amount category for participants). In detail, non-participants have increased 
by 1.399 less employees in 2006 than participants with the smallest loans amounts (see Table 14). 
Controlling for observables in the right graph on the other hand shows that the change in employees 
is no longer discontinuous and we fail to reject exogeneity. 
(Figure 4 and Table 14 about here) 
Another approach to test sensitivity of our results with regard to unobservables is to assess how 
strong an unobserved component would need to be so as to undermine our results. For this purpose, 
we apply bounding as well as simulation analysis. The so-called bounding approach was initially sug-
gested by Rosenbaum (2005) who described the main ideas as follows: bounding introduces a sensi-
tivity parameter Γ that measures the degree of departure from random assignment of treatment. Two 
subjects with the same observed covariates may differ in their odds of receiving the treatment by at 
most a factor of Γ (≥ 1). In an experiment, random assignment of treatment ensures that Γ = 1. In an 
observational study with for example Γ =2 for two subjects which were matched on observed covari-
ates, then one might be twice as likely as the other to receive the treatment because they differ in 
terms of a covariate not observed. As Γ is of course unknown, bounding tries out several values of Γ 
to see how results change. For each value of Γ bounds are placed on a statistical inference. We im-
plement bounding by using the rbounds procedure in Stata developed by DiPrete and Gangl (2004) 
for continuous outcome variables. rbounds uses the results from the matching estimates to calculate 
maximum and minimum p-values from a Wilcoxon's signed rank test between matched pairs of partic-
ipating and non-participating firms for an artificial unobserved variable with different values of Γ. The 
p-values then represent the bound on the significance level of the treatment effect in the case of en-
dogenous selection into treatment.  
It is important to recognize that the results from the Rosenbaum bounds are a ‘‘worst-case’’ scenario. 
DiPrete and Gangl (2004) provide an example where p-values become significant at Γ = 1.15. They 
point to the fact that such a result does not mean that there is no positive effect of treatment on out-
come. It rather means that the confidence interval for the effect would include zero if an unobserved 
variable caused the odds ratio of treatment assignment to differ between participants and non-
participants by 1.15 and if this variable’s effect on outcome was so strong as to almost perfectly de-
termine whether the outcome would be bigger for the participants or the non-participants in each pair 
                                                   
24 See also G. Caetano et al. (2016) for an application of the test to a multivariate context 
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of matched cases in the data. In the case where an unobserved variable had an equally strong effect 
on selection into treatment but only a weak effect on the outcome variable, the confidence interval for 
employment would not contain zero. Nonetheless, the Rosenbaum bounds convey important infor-
mation about the level of uncertainty contained in matching estimators by showing just how large the 
influence of an unobserved variable must be to undermine the conclusions of a matching analysis. 
(Table 15 about here) 
Table 15 summarizes the results of the bounding analysis. If unobserved factors lead to negative or 
positive selection, i. e. those who participate always have a lower or higher growth rate of employees 
than matched non-participants even in the absence of treatment, the p-values will become significant 
for a certain value of Γ. In the absence of unobserved heterogeneity, that is Γ =1.00, the p-values are 
insignificant indicated by a p < 0.05. Starting from that point, we stepwise increase the value of Γ and 
simulate an ascending influence of unobserved factors. At Γ =2.00 the range of possible p-values is 
from 0.0000 to 0.0004, so a bias of this magnitude could not explain the larger firm size increase for 
participants. If we had failed to control by matching a variable strongly related to firm growth and two 
times more common among participants, this would not have been likely to produce a difference in 
employee growth as large as the one we observe (see Rosenbaum, 2005 for a similar example). The 
upper bound of the p-value becomes finally significant at the 5% level when Γ = 2.35. Two firms that 
have the same observable characteristics would then differ in their odds of participating in the micro-
credit program by a factor of 2.35 or 135 percent. In other words, unobserved factors would need to 
have about one and a third times the influence as observed factors in order to undermine the results. 
This can be considered to be a reasonably large number given that we have adjusted for many im-
portant observed factors (see also Aakvik, 2001 or Caliendo and Künn, 2011). Consequently, we con-
clude that our results on the change in employees are robust against strong unobserved selection 
bias. Put in another way, the influence of an unobserved factor would have to be considerable to un-
dermine the conclusions of our matching analysis. 
Since the critical values from bounding are rather abstract, we additionally implement the so-called 
simulation analysis to better illustrate the magnitude of potential hidden bias which would cause us to 
revise our findings of causal effects of microfinance on employment levels. Simulation analysis was 
originally applied as sensitivity test to matching by Ichino et al. (2008). Its basic idea is to start from 
the conditional independence assumption and then examine how the results change as this assump-
tion is weakened in specific ways, whereas for the bounding analysis the conditional independence 
assumption was entirely dropped. We perform the analysis by simulating an unobserved variable or 
so-called confounder that is adapted to the distribution of an observable variable. Since we exactly 
know the influence of the observable characteristics on outcomes and selection, we therefore have a 
direct linkage to the potential unobserved effect for interpretation. Results are shown in Table 16.  
(Table 16 about here) 
The first two columns in Table 16 show the influence of each confounder on the untreated outcome 
and on the selection into treatment. Thereby, a value below (above) 1 indicates a negative (positive) 
impact. The third column shows the resulting ATT given the existence of a confounder with a certain 
distribution. The last column contains the standard error of the ATT. To facilitate a comparison be-
tween actual and simulated results, the ﬁrst row of Table 16 shows the baseline ATT estimate ob-
tained with no confounder in the matching set. In the absence of a confounder, its influence on out-
come and selection is obviously zero and the ATT is 2.361 from nearest-neighbor matching. The fol-
lowing rows of Table 16 show how the baseline estimate changes when the confounding factor is 
calibrated to mimic different observable covariates and is then included in the set of matching varia-
bles. If a confounder is introduced which has the identical distribution as the firm size category 5-9 
employees, the influence on outcome (0.714) and on selection (1.017) would be negative. This means 
that such an unobserved term would have a negative effect on the change in employees in case of no 
treatment and also on being treated at all. Including this simulated unobserved confounder leads to an 
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ATT of 1.948 which is within the range of the ATT in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity. We 
tested other confounders as well. A confounder with the distribution of ‘Ownership type (Joint Stock 
Company)’ would lead to an ATT of 1.873. The simulation of a confounder with a distribution of ‘Gen-
der of owner (female)’ finally results in an ATT of 1.887. Taken in conjunction, these simulations result 
in ATTs which are of a similar dimension as the baseline ATT. This means that the existence of any 
unobservables which influence selection or outcome by a similar magnitude as certain observable 
variables, would still not largely alter the positive effect of the microfinance program on creating jobs 
for participating firms. 
To repeat, no test can directly justify the conditional independence assumption. However, the per-
formed exogeneity test as well as the bounding and simulation analyses convey an impression of 
robustness of the baseline matching estimates. Overall, the presented sensitivity analyses in this sec-
tion find that the direction and dimension of our estimated treatment effect holds which increases con-
fidence in the robustness of our results even with respect to unobserved heterogeneity. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we analyze the impact of a microfinance program in Bulgaria. The program is intended 
to ease credit constraints of existing firms and thus contribute to the creation of wage-employment. 
The unique firm-level panel data provides an important opportunity to address two research gaps with 
regard to microfinance impact assessments: First, we are able to add to the scarce literature on wage-
employment effects of microfinance rather than self-employment as most other studies are limited to. 
We do so by providing evidence for microloans which are larger in size than what has been studied so 
far. Second, drawing on empirical evidence from a program in Bulgaria with typical features for the 
region, the study also contributes to the largely neglected area of impact assessments for micro-
finance in more developed contexts such as Eastern Europe.  
We base our analysis on propensity score matching and extend the standard approach to a differ-
ence-in-differences matching estimator to assess the effectiveness of participating in the microcredit 
program as opposed to non-participation. Our identifying assumption is that conditional on the infor-
mation in our dataset, selection into the program can be assumed to be random such that differences 
in outcome between participants and non-participants can be interpreted as causal effects. To justify 
this very strong assumption, we carefully assess the sensitivity of our results. The application of dif-
ferent matching estimators does not alter results. The extension of variables for the baseline year or 
the inclusion of longer time trends neither has an impact on the causal estimates. In fact, the consid-
eration of longer time trends before treatment suggests that in the absence of the program, both par-
ticipants and non-participants would have the same trend in the outcome variable. Our results with 
propensity score matching are furthermore similar to treatment effects estimated through a linear re-
gression model with ordinary least squares. Regarding sensitivity to unobservables, the application of 
a recently developed test of exogeneity shows that we cannot reject exogeneity in our model. The 
outcome is no longer discontinuous once we control for observable characteristics. The so-called 
bounding approach furthermore detects that unobserved factors would need to be large (1.35 times 
the influence of observables) in order to undermine the results. In the same manner, the simulation of 
an unobserved variable that is adapted to the distribution of an observable variable would not largely 
alter our estimates. 
As main result, we find a relatively large positive and significant effect of microcredit on wage-
employment. Participating firms have on average 2.48 more employees two years after receiving a 
microcredit than do matched non-participants. Related to the number of employees before treatment, 
this translates into a growth difference in terms of firm size of 33 percent for participants. The estimat-
ed effect seems very plausible when comparing labor costs of an additional employee to loan size. 
Average annual labor costs in Bulgaria amounted to about EUR 2,600 at the end of 2006 (including 
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wage, social contributions and taxes paid by the employer).25 An increase in 2.48 employees would 
hence cost EUR 6,448 which is very close to the average loan size of EUR 7,092.  
The microcredit program also has a long lasting impact on wage-employment. Significant differences 
between the participating and matched non-participating firms exist for at least six years after recep-
tion of the microcredit. At the same time, the increase in the number of employees for participants is 
characterized by initial upward and downward adjustments during the first two years after treatment 
before stabilizing at a higher level of firm size. Consequently, only an evaluation period of two or more 
years after treatment seems able to capture the sustainable impact of microfinance on firm growth.  
Heterogeneous effects for sub-groups first of all support the finding from other studies that smaller 
firms are more constrained by credit than are larger firms. The treatment effect increases with de-
creasing firm size and is largest for micro-enterprises. Our results for different loan purposes 
moreover point to the fact that the time at which the impact occurs is affected by what the loan is used 
for. While working capital loans show a more immediate effect, loans for investment purposes 
increase their impact over time. It therefore seems advisable to take into consideration the type of 
loan purpose when determining the appropriate evaluation period for microfinance impact assess-
ments. As far as loan size is finally concerned, our data only provides limited scope for assessing 
whether larger loans lead to larger impacts due to very few small loans in our sample. With respect to 
loans above what has been studied so far, i.e. loans above EUR 500 (or USD 1,664 PPP-adjusted) 
we find a very similar impact of 25-30 percent on wage-employment irrespective of the loan amount. 
This finding might rather point to a certain loan size threshold for positive effects to unfold and that the 
loans assessed in this study are above that threshold. That would also explain why the impact on 
wage-employment found in this study is considerably larger than what has been estimated so far. 
Another type of explanation could be related to the specific macroeconomic and institutional environ-
ment for firms in Eastern European which helped microcredit to unfold such positive effects on wage-
employment. Ahlin et al. (2011), for example, find that the success of microfinance is very context-
specific. While they focus on the performance of microfinance providers, this may be true in a more 
general manner for microfinance’s impact. In this regard, it would be very interesting to see further 
studies in the future for programs in similarly developed countries as Bulgaria and compare our re-
sults to. It furthermore could be very worthwhile for future research to study effects in a similar context 
but for a program with a larger number of very small loans comparable to existing studies. This would 
allow to test if there indeed exists a minimum loan amount for positive effects of microfinance on 
wage-employment. 
With regard to the broader economic implications for the labor market, an increase of 2.5 employees 
(33%) per loan recipient (i.e., 2,416 jobs for 974 recipients) might at first not appear transformative. 
Given that our sample of participants was limited to legal entities among borrowers and that the pro-
gram was rapidly expanding, we expect the full economic impact to be more pronounced. By assum-
ing that the private individuals among borrowers in 2004 in relative terms grew just as much as the 
evaluated legal entities the total effect would rather amount to almost 10,000 jobs for a single year. 
Finally, in terms of not only benefits but also costs of microfinance, it must be stressed that the bank 
was operating in a profitable manner and the program can be regarded as financially self-sustaining. 
In light of these findings, it seems that the high expectations of policymakers for the job creating ef-
fects of microcredit can indeed be justified for programs which are characterized by relatively large 
loan sizes in more developed contexts. 
  
                                                   
25 See: https://infostat.nsi.bg/infostat/pages/module.jsf?x_2=79 (Accessed: 24 February 2017). 
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10 TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 1  
Overview of impact assessments on microfinance and employment 
Authors Country 
Program 
Research Design a 
Effects 
Loan Borrower MFI self-employmentb 
wage-
employment 
Abou-Ali et al. 
(2010) Egypt individual households 
NGO/ 
bank PSM + 
c 
Angelucci et al. 
(2015) Mexico group women bank 
RCT (expansion of program into new areas using randomized loan 
promotion) 0  
Attanasio et al. 
(2015) Mongolia 
individual / 
group women bank RCT (expansion of program into new areas) 0/+  
Augsburg et al. 
(2015) 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina individual  
private 
individuals NGO RCT (randomized approval for marginally creditworthy loan applicants) +/0  
Banerjee, Duflo, et 
al. (2015) India group women NGO RCT (expansion of program into new areas) + 0/- 
Bruhn and Love 
(2014) Mexico individual 
private 
individuals bank 
DiD by exploiting cross-time and cross-municipality variation in simultaneous 
rollout of 800 branches in new areas +/0 
c 




Thailand group women NGO 
DiD and ‘pipeline design’ (treated are clients in program villages; controls are 
future clients in new program villages surveyed between loan application and 
disbursement and randomly selected non-clients in both type of villages) 
0  
Crépon et al. 
(2015) Morocco group 
private 
individuals  NGO RCT (expansion of program into new areas) 0  
Dunn and Arbuckle 
(2001) Peru individual firms bank 
DiD and ‘pipeline design’ (treated are clients in program villages; controls are 
future clients in new program villages surveyed between loan application and 





Bangladesh group households bank PSM (replication of Chemin, 2008) 0/0  
Gubert and 
Roubaud (2011) Madagascar individual firms NGO PSM combined with DiD - 0 
Karlan and Zinman 
(2011) Philippines individual 
private 
individuals bank RCT (randomize approval for marginally creditworthy loan applicants) - - 
Montgomery (2005) Pakistan group private individuals bank 
DiD and ‘pipeline design’ (treated are clients in program villages; controls are 
future clients in new program villages surveyed between loan application and 
disbursement and randomly selected non-clients in both type of villages) 
+/0  
Pitt and Khandker 
(1998) 
Bangladesh group households bank Regression on discontinuity based on eligibility rule (land ownership) by 
comparing individuals just above and below eligibility 
-/+  
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Morduch (2014) Bangladesh group households bank 
Replication of Pitt and Khandker (1998) by dropping outliers, using a robust 
linear estimator and a new program for estimation of mixed process maxi-
mum likelihood models 
-/0  
Setboonsarng and 
Parpiev (2008) Pakistan group 
private indi-
viduals bank PSM (re-estimation of data used in Montgomery, 2005) 0  
Tedeschi and 
Karlan (2010) Peru individual firms bank 
DiD and ‘pipeline design’ (treated are clients in program villages; controls are 
future clients in new program villages surveyed between loan application and 
disbursement and randomly selected non-clients in both type of villages; re-
estimation of data in Dunn and Arbuckle, 2001) 
+ + 
a PSM = Propensity score matching, RCT= Randomized Control Trial, DiD = Difference in Differences, IV=Instrumental Variables 
b Self-employment includes business ownership and business creation: negative, + positive, 0 no or insignificant effect) 
c Wage-employment effects are measured on the level of aggregate employment rates for program areas. No information available on wage-employment effects in borrowers firms. 
 
TABLE 2  
Comparison of effects on wage-employment in microfinance impact assessments 
Authors Country Outcome variable Impact on wage-employment Loan size (market exchange rate) 







et al. (2015) 
India 
Number of employees of new and 
existing firms 
0: insignificant (-0.05 employees or -20%) for 
existing businesses  
-0.2 employees (or -20%) for new businesses 
USD 200 USD 777 18 months 0.3  
Karlan and 
Zinman (2011) Philippines 
Number of paid employees in all 
household businesses - 0.27 employees (-39%) 
USD 220 USD 726 11-22 months 0.7 
Dunn and 
Arbuckle (2001) Peru Total days worked per month for non-
household members in top 3 client 
firms 
+2.49 days (0.13 employees or 4%) 




Karlan (2010) Peru 
+1.18 days (0.06 employees or 3%) 24 months 
Gubert and 
Roubaud (2011) Madagascar Number of workers per firm 
0: insignificant (around +9%) USD 443 USD 1,616 36 months 2.3  
a Purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted exchange rates are calculated by using the conversion factor to market exchange rate for a specific country in 2006 as indicated by the Worldbank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPPC.RF (Accessed 13 March 2017) 
b Number of employees before start of the program 
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TABLE 3 
Exit of sample firms 2004-2009 
 Participants Non-Participants 
 Sample size 
2003 974  60,032  
   
Year of exit Exit rate (Percentage) 
2004 0.2% 4.6% 
2005 1.3% 4.5% 
2006 1.4% 4.6% 
2007 5.5% 6.1% 
2008 6.4% 5.3% 
2009 4.8% 6.1% 




 Participants Non-Participants 
Firm size category   
  Micro (1-9 employees) 78.1 71.7 
  Small (10-49 employees) 20.0 22.6 
  Medium (50-249 employees) 1.8 5.7 
Employees (number) 7.492 (13.156) 12.737 (26.009) 
Sector (NACE section)a   
  Agriculture, hunting, forestry 2.7 5.8 
  Fishing 0.0 0.1 
  Mining and quarrying 0.0 0.2 
  Manufacturing 16.8 16.6 
  Electricity, gas and water supply 0.1 0.2 
  Construction 3.1 7.3 
  Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 49.2 42.2 
  Hotels and restaurants 5.2 3.5 
  Transportation, storage, communications 10.4 5.8 
  Financial intermediation 0.5 1.8 
  Real estate and renting activities 7.1 11.3 
  Public administration and defense 0.0 0.0 
  Education 0.3 0.3 
  Health and social work 2.2 2.5 
  Other services activities 2.5 2.4 
Location (by Economic Development)b   
  Very Good 12.8 9.4 
  Good 30.7 41.3 
  Average 25.2 18.8 
  Unsatisfactory 19.3 17.0 
  Weak 12.0 13.6 
Ownership typec   
  General partnership 0.4 5.2 
  Limited partnership 44.0 34.3 
  Joint-stock company 30.9 28.1 
  Limited liability company 23.5 29.1 
  State enterprise 1.1 3.2 
Gender of ownerd   
  Male 72.9 61.7 
  Female 26.9 20.6 
  No information 0.2 17.8 
Sample size 974 60,032 
Change in Employees 2003-2006 (number)e 2.726 (12.683) -.181 (18.592) 
Note: Numbers are percentages and measured at the end of 2003 unless otherwise stated; Standard deviation in parentheses. 
a  Sector is defined according to NACE Rev. 1.1. NACE is the standard classification system of economic activities since 
1970 in the European Union. For each observation, we have information on the level of four-digit numerical codes (clas-
ses). We aggregated this information into two-digit numerical codes (divisions), in order to keep enough non-participants 
for the matching with our participants. Here, we present the first level of NACE Rev. 1.1 consisting of so-called sections. 
b Bulgaria is divided into 28 districts, 264 municipalities and about 4,360 places with different 4-digit postal codes. We have 
information on the level of postal codes for each observation. Furthermore we clustered observations by district into five 
categories of economic development. We developed a composite index based on GDP per capita, unemployment and 
36 
employment rate of the population aged 15+, number of non-financial companies per 1,000 people, expenditures for ac-
quisition of fixed tangible assets per 1,000 people and annual income per household member. The clustering is then per-
formed by calculating mean ranks of economic development for each district in the period 2003 to 2006 and dividing dis-
tricts into five groups. All data originates from the National Statistical Institute (NSI) of Bulgaria. 
c According to the Bulgarian commercial law the following legal forms exist for commercial companies: General partner-
ship, Limited Partnership, Partnership Limited by shares (regrouped with Limited Partnership due to small number of ob-
servations), Limited Liability Company and Joint Stock Company. Legal forms differ in their degree of liability for the com-
panies’ obligations by their members, in requirements for minimum capital and in the according level of complexity for 
management and reporting. In addition, there exist state-owned and municipal enterprises into which we included the 
small number of associations and co-operations. 
d The information on gender of owners is based on first and last names of firm owners in the Amadeus database. Owners 
are defined as holding at least 25 percent of a company. In all but 41 cases (where the first indicated owner was used), 
the information in Amadeus comprised only one person as owner. 
e The difference in difference estimator of the unmatched sample therefore amounts to 2.907 and a standard error of 0.598 
 
TABLE 5 
Probit estimation of participation probability 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Number of Employees -0.008* 0.004 
Firm size categories a chi2(11) =  17.10*  
Sector by NACE divisions a chi2(43) =  280.58***  
Location by districts a chi2 (24) = 209.94***  
Ownership type (Ref.: General partnership)   
  Limited partnership -0.719** 0.338 
  Joint-stock company -0.575* 0.338 
  Limited liability company -0.673** 0.336 
  State enterprise -1.070*** 0.356 
Gender of owner (Ref.: no information)   
  Male 1.853*** 0.312 
  Female 1.876*** 0.313 
Constant -3.159*** 0.417 
Number of observations      
  Participants 974  
  Non-participants 57,691  
LR chi2(84) 944.26***  
Prob > chi2 0.000  
Pseudo R2 0.095  
Log likelihood -4485.3754  
Notes:  The table reports probit estimations. For definitions of the variables see notes in Table 3.  
a Depicted is the joint significance for dummy variables based on Wald tests. 
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance level 
 
TABLE 6 
Firms off and on common support region 
Treatment assignment Off support On support Total 
Participants 4 970 974  
Non-participants 0 57,691 57,691 
Total 4 58,661 58,665 
Note: The propensity score distributions are based on probit estimations in Table 5. Common support is imposed by dropping 





Balancing Tests (after caliper matching) 
T-test of equal means  Mean % reduction  of bias t-test 
Variable  Participants Non-participants 
 t p>t 
Employees (number) Unmatched 7.492 12.496  -6.09 0.000 
 Matched 7.478 7.087 92.2 0.64 0.525 
Firm size categories a Unmatched  7 (12) 
 Matched  0 (12) 
Sector by NACE division a Unmatched  16 (44) 
 Matched  0 (44) 
Location by districts a Unmatched  18 (24) 
 Matched  0 (24) 
Ownership type (Ref.: General partnership)      
  Limited partnership Unmatched 0.441 0.344  6.31 0.000 
 Matched 0.442 0.463 78.7 -0.91 0.362 
  Joint-stock company Unmatched 0.309 0.286  1.61 0.107 
 Matched 0.307 0.300 69.3 0.35 0.730 
  Limited liability company Unmatched 0.235 0.291  -3.84 0.000 
 Matched 0.236 0.224 78.0 0.65 0.518 
  State enterprise Unmatched 0.011 0.031  -3.51 0.000 
 Matched 0.011 0.013 89.4 -0.41 0.681 
Gender of owner (Ref.: no information)      
  Male Unmatched 0.729 0.621  6.88 0.000 
 Matched 0.729 0.745 84.7 -0.82 0.410 
  Female Unmatched 0.269 0.208  4.62 0.000 
 Matched 0.269 0.253 72.8 0.83 0.408 
       
Pseudo-R2 Unmatched 0.095     
 Matched 0.012     
       
LR chi2 Unmatched 944.26 p-value 0.000   
 Matched 32.84 p-value 1.000   
       
Mean standardized bias Unmatched 7.8     
 Matched 2.1     
Notes: For definitions of the variables see notes in Table 3. 
a Depicted is the number of dummy variables with mean values that differ significantly at the 10 percent level be-
tween participants and non-participants. The total number of dummy variables is indicated in parentheses. 
 
TABLE 8 
Main treatment effects with caliper matching 
Sample Number of  Employees 2003 
Number of  
Employees 2006 Difference 
ATT 
(Δ Number of  
employees 2006-2003) 
S.E. 
Participants (Matched) 7.478 10.200 2.722 
2.480*** 0.564 
Non-Participants (Matched) 7.087 7.328 0.241 
Non-Participants (Unmatched) 12.497 12.451 -0.045   
Notes: Estimates are based on a caliper matching estimator with a bandwidth of 0.05.  





Main treatment effects with different matching estimators 
Matching Estimator ATTa S.E. 
Caliper Matching (bandwidth 0.05) 2.481***  0.564 
Caliper Matching (bandwidth 0.01) 2.480***  0.564 
Caliper Matching (bandwidth 0.001) 2.504***  0.567 
Nearest Neighbor (1 neighbor, with replacement) 2.480***  0.564 
Nearest Neighbor (1 neighbor, without replacement) 2.280***  0.514 
Radius Matching (bandwidth 0.05) 2.592***  0.417 
Kernel Matching (bandwidth 0.05, Gaussian weighting function) 2.667***  0.415 
Kernel Matching (bandwidth 0.05, Epanechnikov weighting function) 2.485*** 0.418 
Note: Depicted are average treatment effects on the treated as the difference in outcome variables between participants and 
non-participants. For radius and kernel matching estimates the standard error is based on bootstrapping with 100 replica-
tions. 
a Absolute change defined as Δ N employees 2006 - N employees 2003.  
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance level 
 
TABLE 10 
Dynamic treatment effects 
Year ATTa S.E. 


















2003 (before treatment) 0 0 7.478 7.087 12.497 970 57,691 
2004 (year of treatment) 2.598*** 0.292 10.286 7.296 12.333 970 57,691 
2005 (1 year after treatment) 1.289*** 0.404 8.790 7.109 12.207 970 57,691 
2006 (2 years after treatment) 2.480*** 0.562 10.200 7.328 12.451 970 57,691 
2007 (3 years after treatment) 2.694*** 0.717 11.052 7.702 13.313 904 54,882 
2008 (4 years after treatment) 3.803*** 1.054 11.378 8.052 12.309 894 54,941 
2009 (5 years after treatment) 2.040*** 0.767 9.790 7.827 10.885 951 56,694 
2010 (6 years after treatment) 2.110*** 0.711 8.350 5.973 8.966 958 57,603 
Notes: Estimates are based on a caliper matching estimator with a bandwidth of 0.05.  
a Absolute change defined as Δ N employees year Y - N employees 2003.  





Heterogeneous treatment effects 












Base Effect 2.480*** 0.562 0.332 7.478 970 57,691 
Loan size c       
  small 1.058*** 0.337 0.276 3.830 312 40,893 
  medium 1.782** 0.782 0.300 5.954 325 48,753 
  large 3.802*** 1.451 0.250 12.322 329 52,719 
  < EUR 500 0.594 0.445 0.268 2.219 32 17,822 
  EUR 500-1,000 0.670* 0.365 0.239 2.800 100 29,862 
Firm size       
  micro (1-9 employees) 1.590*** 0.302 0.504 3.156 759 41,617 
  small (10-49 employees) 4.166** 1.693 0.243 17.160 187 11,395 
  medium (50-249 employees) -25.471 20.448 -0.305 83.529 17 560 
Loan purpose       
  working capital 2.301*** 0.881 0.283 8.129 412 53,506 
  investment 1.799*** 0.694 0.257 6.991 557 54,602 
Location (non-participants 
from districts without program) 2.396*** 0.854 0.328 7.314 934 6,776 
Notes: Estimates are based on a caliper matching estimator with a bandwidth of 0.05.  
a Absolute change defined as Δ N employees 2006 - N employees 2003.  
b Relative change defined as ୼	୒	ୣ୫୮୪୭୷ୣୣୱ	ଶ଴଴଺	ି	୒	ୣ୫୮୪୭୷ୣୣୱ	ଶ଴଴ଷ
୒	ୣ୫୮୪୭୷ୣୣୱ	୮ୟ୰୲୧ୡ୧୮ୟ୬୲ୱ	ଶ଴଴ଷ
 
c Loan amount categories are defined as small < 2,000 EUR, medium= 2,0000 -6,000 EUR, and large > 6,000 EUR. 
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance level  
 
TABLE 12 
Sensitivity analysis for alternative specifications of propensity score estimation 
 ATTa S.E. Number participants 
Number non-
participants 
Base Effect 2.480*** 0.564 970 57,691 
Additional years prior treatment     
  Employees 2002, 2001, 2000 2.768* 1.440 314 30,186 
  Δ N employees 2003 – N employees 2000 3.057** 1.201 314 30,186 
Additional variables at baseline     
  Sales, profit, productivity 2003 2.780*** 0.944 545 22,905 
Exact matching on district 1.691*** 0.621 971 59,574 
Notes: Estimates are based on a caliper matching estimator with a bandwidth of 0.05.  
a Absolute change defined as Δ N employees 2006 - N employees 2003.  




 Unmatched / without control variables Matched / with control variables 
PSM (ATTa / S.E.) 2.770*** 0.592 2.480*** 0.564 
OLS on full sample (61,006 obs)  2.907*** 0.598 1.856*** 0.586 
OLS on matched sample (58,665 obs) 2.770*** 0.592 1.887*** 0.584 
Notes: Estimates are based on a caliper matching estimator with a bandwidth of 0.05. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
a Absolute change defined as Δ N employees 2006 - N employees 2003.  




Exogeneity test results 
Outcome variable: Change in employees 2006 No controls With controls 
Treatment (1= zero loan) -1.339 (3.004) -0.436 (2.926) 
Loan amount categories  yes yes 
Number of Employees  yes 
Firm size categories  yes 
Sector by NACE divisions  yes 
Location by districts  yes 
Ownership type  yes 
Gender of owner  yes 
Constant 1.158 (3.003) 6.003 (3.310) 
Observations 61,006 61,006 
R-squared 0.000 0.057 
 
TABLE 15 
Sensitivity analysis with bounding 
Outcome variable: Change in Employees 2006 
 Significance levels p-critical (Wilcoxon signed rank test) 
Γ Lower bound Upper bound 
1.00 0.000 0.000 
1.25 0.000 0.000 
1.50 0.000 4.2e-12 
1.75 0.000 4.4e-07 
2.00 0.000 0.0004 
2.25 0.000 0.027 
2.30 0.000 0.049 
2.35 0.000 0.081 
2.40 0.000 0.126 
2.50 0.000 0.257 
2.75 0.000 0.690 
3.00 0.000 0.934 
Note: Reported results are achieved by using rbounds.ado from DiPrete and Gangl (2004). Results are based on a caliper 
matching estimator with a bandwidth of 0.05. 
 
TABLE 16 
Sensitivity analysis with simulation analysis 
Confounder Influence of unobserved  confounder on ATT
a S.E. 
 Outcome Selection   
No unobserved heterogeneity 0.00 0.00 2.361 0.427 
Confounder with an influence like (see Table 4)     
  Firm size category (5-9 employees) 0.714 1.017 1.948 0.553 
  Ownership type (Joint Stock Company) 1.307 1.111 1.873 0.570 
  Gender of owner (female) 1.187 1.677 1.887 0.556 
Note: Reported results are achieved by using sensatt.ado from Nannicini (2007) and are related to the continuous outcome 
variable absolute change in employees 2006. The potential confounder is simulated on the basis of a binary transformation of 
the outcome: Y=1 if the outcome is above the mean. Results are based on 100 iterations for the simulation of the confounder 
and the ATT estimation. The underlying matching algorithm is nearest neighbor matching imposing common support based on 
the Stata command pscore.  





Program Presence on 31 December 2004 (districts with branch) 
 
Source: ProCredit Bank Bulgaria 
 
FIGURE 2 
Dynamic development of employees 2003-2010 (participants, matched non-participants, full sample of non-participants) 
 































Dynamic development of employees 2000-2006 for sub-samples  
 
Notes: Estimates are based on a caliper matching estimator with a bandwidth of 0.05. The specification for the estimation of the 
propensity score is extended by Δ N employees 2003 – N employees 2000. 
 
FIGURE 4 
Exogeneity test results 
  
Note: In the left plot the vertical axis shows the mean change in employees per given loan amount, i.e. horizontal axis variable. 
The right plot shows on the vertical axis the mean residuals from a linear regression with controls per given loan amount Loan 
amount is aggregated into ten different categories: EUR 0; EUR 1-500; EUR 501-1,500; EUR 1,501-2,500; EUR 2,501-4,000; 
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